Timor Telecom case study: ten years of experience by Hermenegildo, André Filipe Tomé Lopes Castelhano
    
1 
 
 
A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of Masters Degree 
in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics. 
 
 
 
 
TIMOR TELECOM CASE STUDY – TEN YEARS OF EXPERIENCE 
 
 
 
 
ANDRÉ FILIPE TOMÉ LOPES CASTELHANO HERMENEGILDO, MST 16000393 
 
 
 
 
 
A Project carried out under the supervision of Professor José Neves de Adelino 
 
 
June 2013 
 
 
    
2 
 
        NOVA SCHOOL OF BUSSINESS & ECONOMICS 
 
Timor Telecom Case Study: Ten Years of Experience 
Dr. Manuel Capitão Amaro, Timor Telecom’s CEO since 2007, was once again assessing the 
final results of last week’s negotiations with the Timorese Government.  At the top of the 
discussion were the anticipated cession of the concession contract signed in 2002 and the future 
of Timor Telecom (TT), the subsidiary of Portugal Telecom (PT) operating in East Timor. The 15 
year Build Operate and Transfer (BOT) contract, whereby TT would manage and provide 
telecom services under an exclusive basis, was going to terminate after only 10 years. Market 
conditions were going to change with the entrance of two major telecom players in South East 
Asia. From the top of his office in Timor Plaza, he gathered his team around the table to draft a 
strategic plan to prepare the company for the great challenge lying ahead.  
 
Prior to 1999: East Timor at a glance 
 The legacy of East Timor was that its people had always lived under the influence of 
foreigners. For centuries, this small territory on the eastern part of the Timor Island was under 
Portuguese sovereignty. The Portuguese Revolution in 1974 brought the independence of the 
former Portuguese colonies, and East Timor had the opportunity to become an independent 
nation. However, during the year of 1975, Indonesia moved into East Timor with military forces 
and declared its annexation. Internationally, the United Nations (UN) never accepted this 
declaration, which was only ratified by Australia.  
The Indonesian occupation lasted for 24 years until 1999. Despite some economic growth and 
development during these years, the East Timorese population never accepted being governed 
by their Indonesian neighbours. It is estimated that the East Timorese population was reduced 
by almost one quarter, during this period due to fighting, forced migration or starvation. The 
1990’s brought two major significant episodes that could not be ignored by the International 
Community: the massacre of Santa Cruz in 19911 and the two Nobel Peace prizes awarded in 
1996 to two Timorese activists2. 
In 1999, United Nations was able to bring together representatives from the Indonesian and 
Portuguese Governments. Both parties agreed that the East Timorese people had the right to 
decide about their future, through a referendum supervised by UN observers. The enthusiasm 
of becoming an independent nation, and voting for the first time was so strong that an 
                                                          
1
 The Indonesian army executed 201 unarmed Timorese during an independence manifestation, in Dili. 
2 Ximenes Belo and José Ramos-Horta were awarded with the Nobel Peace Prizes in 1996, due their 
contribution to a peaceful solution for East Timor.   
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overwhelming majority voted against “a greater autonomy” proposed by Indonesia in favour of 
total independence. The abstention rate was almost nil. 
Unfortunately, the announcement of the referendum results was followed by terror, violence 
and widespread destruction by organized militias supported by the Indonesian army. During 
this period, it is estimated that more than 1.400 people were executed, and 300.000 East 
Timorese were forced to migrate to the western part of the island, or to the mountains. 
Moreover, a great part of the existing infrastructure was destroyed, including 
telecommunications assets, leaving the young nation without a platform for development and 
seriously constraining its economic growth. 
The UN was forced to deploy an international military convoy3 in order to restore the order and 
stop the suffering of thousands of East Timorese people.  
 
To be reborn among the ashes 
UN and the International Community were concerned about the future of this nation. On 
October 25th of 1999, the UN Security Council established a Transitional Administration (ETTA), 
headed by the governor Sérgio Vieira de Mello, and supported by a police arm in East Timor. 
The mission was to maintain the peace and help to establish the first national government, 
capable of implementing policies focused on the reduction of the nation’s widespread poverty 
(see Exhibit 2) raising levels of education and productivity. With this proposal, a National 
Council was created, aiming to introduce Timorese people to political life. There was an urgent 
need for skilled personnel and expatriates to lead different areas of development. Meanwhile, 
the East Timorese people counted on the support of international NGOs, foreign governmental 
agencies and international institutions, such as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, 
the International Monetary Fund, and the European Union.4 
The East Timorese economy suffered a significant downturn with the events that followed the 
vote on independence. The sudden halt of all productive activity in the last four months of 1999 
resulted in a 38.5% decrease in GDP5. When the UN personnel arrived in the country, they were 
faced with many difficulties regarding to initial conditions. The country was left without any 
legal or regulatory system after the Indonesian occupation. Businesses and service companies 
were forced to close due to the desertion of their qualified work force, mostly composed by 
Indonesian and Chinese workers. During the Indonesian occupation, no developments were 
made in the educational system and no University teaching facilities were created.6 East 
Timorese people were therefore not qualified to assume political positions, or to develop and 
operate businesses funded by private investment in the near future.  
                                                          
3
 It was mostly compound by Australian military forces.  
4 Between 1999 and 2009, it was accounted more than US$5.2 billion as international aid destined to East 
Timor. Around 90% of this amount was used to finance expatriates salaries, overseas administrations, 
foreign soldiers, external consultancy, among others. Only US$520 million had directly entered in the 
Timorese economy. (source: Timor-Leste Institute for Developing Monitoring and Analysis) 
5 IMF estimates. 
6 The most fortunate Timorese Youth had to go to Denpasar or Jakarta, in Indonesia, to take a superior 
degree. Most of the times, they did not return to East Timor. 
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Many infrastructures were either destroyed by guerrilla warfare, or rendered useless due to 
lack of maintenance and qualified people to operate them. Indonesians built an extensive road 
system throughout the island with very low standards of design and construction, which 
required constant maintenance to be kept in usable conditions. Port facilities in Dili were never 
used for international shipping and such improvements were crucial to improve both 
international trade and foreign aid. Electrical power generation was virtually wiped out and 
many regions were left without electricity.7 Even in Dili, business and service providers could 
not rely on the public power distribution, due to constant network break downs. 
Telecommunications assets were mostly destroyed during the war, leaving the island without a 
functional service of communications.  
During the first years following the deployment of the UN international mission in 2000, 
international governance and financial aid boosted the economic activity. Private investors from 
all over the world started to consider East Timor as a potential market for growth, and foreign 
direct investment started to flow into the country’s economy. 
 
The Importance of the Telecommunications Sector 
 Before the tension erupted between Indonesia and the eastern part of the Timor Island, Telkom 
Indonesia8 was the sole provider of telecommunications services in East Timor. The company’s 
main services were limited to the capital, Dili, with only few services provided in the District 
Capitals (mainly voice wire line connections). The rest of the island was unconnected (see 
Exhibit 1). 
After the conflict, the UN found most of the telecommunications network completely 
destroyed9. The most serious damages were made to electronic equipment and buildings (see 
Exhibit 3). Initially, ETTA invited an Australian telecommunications company, Telstra, to 
operate in those still functional assets around Dili. Additionally, Telstra extended its mobile 
service network from Australia, via satellite connection, in order to provide telecommunication 
services in the remaining districts.  However, this solution was adopted on a temporary basis, 
since it was very costly and it would not support the nation’s desirable economic growth level.  
At the time, globalization and information technologies were hot topics in international 
discussion forums. A proper telecommunications sector was seen as a precondition to plan the 
social and economic development of a nation, and the lack of such infrastructures was therefore 
a huge concern for the ETTA. Without telecommunications, the nation’s social cohesion and 
commercial development was at risk, as well as the access to urgently needed foreign 
investment and international aid. The isolation would therefore jeopardize the international 
competitiveness of the economy.     
                                                          
7
The Timorese Living Standard Measurement Survey accounted more than three quarters of the 
population lived without electricity in the post-conflict. 
8 At the time, Telkom Indonesia was the biggest Indonesian telecom player. 
9 The only exception was the exchange site in Dili. 
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The reconstruction of the telecommunications network in East Timor was not an easy task. The 
Government did not have enough resources to finance such an onerous investment, and neither 
could it guarantee the repayment of an international loan. In fact, there was a lot of political 
instability and no one could predict if the first governmental elections would change this 
situation.  
One possible alternative was to deliver this task to the private sector. This solution had the 
advantage of allowing an experienced industry player to develop a new telecommunications 
system. A private sector player would be able to provide the know-how, the available 
technology, and the right suppliers for the development of the new network. The new telecom 
would also have to guarantee the financial resources to cover the required investment along the 
upcoming years. 
The Transitional Administration was convinced of the importance of finding a sustainable 
international telecommunications player, able to guarantee the development of the East 
Timorese telecommunications sector. Therefore, ETTA specialists decided to launch a public 
“Build, Operate and Transfer” tender (see Exhibit 4). 
 
The Business Plan 
The East Timorese market was an old “love story” for PT, a Portuguese telecom company. 
Previous studies had already been made in order to understand if this former Portuguese 
colony could be a profitable and suitable market for PT. The violent events of 1999 cooled, 
during a certain period, the Portuguese interest in the Timorese telecommunications market, 
but the public tender launched by the ETTA had placed the “Timor folder” back in PT’s agenda.  
Eng. º José Jardim was at the time the head of PT’s International Investments Department. He 
and his team had a two major challenge in their hands. First, they would have to gather 
necessary arguments to convince PT’s board that East Timor would be a profitable operation, 
even if it presented a highly risky profile. Then, they would have to present a wining proposal 
to ETTA, in order to obtain the exclusive operational licence.  
 
An island in an ocean of uncertainty… 
When Jardim reopened the “Timor folder”, he noticed the lack of information about the country 
and about its future outlook. In particular, two decision making factors were uncertain, which 
are key to the telecoms industry: the population size and the country’s economic activity.10  
                                                          
10 To minimize this critical problem, UN specialists developed an Information Memorandum with tangible 
data capable of supporting forecasts, which was delivered to each BOT applicant. You can found some 
figures in Exhibit 6 and the entire population at http://www.gov.east-
timor.org/old/tenders/20010810.im.pdf. 
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PT was less worried about the population size, because managing a telecom operation could be 
profitable even in relative small market, under one condition: the population and the 
enterprises must have a minimum available income to spend on telecommunication services. PT 
was confident that population growth would be fuelled by a higher sense of safety, and by the 
desired economic development. 
The biggest concern was related to the economic performance of the nation in the upcoming 
years.11 The International Community hoped that East Timor could catch the “Development 
Highway” but there were many risks that could jeopardize the upward evolution of the 
economy. 
From the top of all his experience in performing due diligences in developing countries, Jardim 
started to list the main threats that a new telecom company would face in East Timor. 
On the top of the list was the significant political uncertainty surrounding the country’s future 
outlook. Despite of the announcement of the first elections for a National Government, 
experience revealed that new democracies were still politically and socially unstable. The idea 
of investing in a country which was still building its political and legal framework incorporated 
a real risk that would be hard to tackle.  
Next, PT focused on the predictable short term results of investing in one of the youngest 
countries in the world and one of the least developed in South East Asia. The investment would 
bear a significant cash flow risk, since the Timorese population might not have enough 
available income to spend on telecommunications services. However, PT was aware of the 
important role that UN personnel and the foreign community would play in the economic 
development of the country. The “Malais”12 represented the purchasing power of the Timorese 
economy and they would sustain the telecommunications sector during the initial years. The 
“money questions” were for how long UN institutions would remain in East Timor, and what 
would be the economic consequences of their departure. The UN presence in post conflict 
countries was also a safety guarantee and an important factor to promote foreign direct 
investment.  
At the time, the cost of telecommunications equipment (mobile telephones or computers) was 
also very high, which would definitely impose a barrier to the demand of mobile and internet 
services in a country with low GDP.   
Last but not the least, there was the big question mark about whether or not East Timor would 
effectively benefit from all the foreign aid (see Exhibit 6), and if it would be able to develop a 
resilient economy capable of creating and distributing wealth among the population. It was 
already known the great potential of the recently discovered oil reserves in the Timor Gap Oil13, 
                                                          
11 Several studies indicate the telecom industry is highly correlated with the economic activity of a nation 
and the growth of demand depends on the ability of an effective creation and redistribution of wealth. 
12 This is the term used to call foreigners in Tetun.  
13 The Timor Gap Oil is located in East Timor Sea which separates the East Timorese territory from the 
Australian continent. 
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however it was not yet decided how far Timorese jurisdiction extended in the East Timor Sea14. 
The existing oil and gas resources would definitely be the most valuable national assets, and the 
biggest sources of future revenues. Consequently, the wealth of the nation would depend on the 
future Government’s capacity to negotiate exploration licenses with international players.  
 
… and full of challenges. 
PT also had in mind the challenges that a telecommunications company would face in East 
Timor, and their impact on the company’s operational and capital expenditures. The lack of 
telecom infrastructures was certainly a barrier to proving a good service in the short term, but it 
was PT’s job to solve it. What really concerned Jardim was the non-existent power supply 
industry15 and badly destroyed roads16. The lack of these two vital infrastructures would 
impose high investments to build and to maintain an effective network on the island.   
The island’s landscape and weather conditions, especially during the wet season, would also 
create great technical difficulties. Fresh in Jardim’s mind was the road trip between Dili and 
Suai17 (see Exhibit 1) and the damages to his back. Transporting metallic infrastructures, 
sensible equipment and workforce along bumpy and dangerous stone roads, would definitely 
be a great challenge. Dili would be the receiving and dispatch point of all imported equipment 
and materials, since it was the only place in the island with decent port facilities.  And the main 
difficulties would be during the wet season, because the rain threatened to block roads and 
isolate sites from maintenance or repairs.  
Timorese human resources were also an important issue that PT had to deal with. During the 
Indonesian occupation, the majority of the East Timorese workforce was specialized in primary 
activities, such as agriculture or fishery. The workforce of the industrial and services sector was 
mainly composed by Indonesian and Chinese nationals. The East Timorese population was 
unprepared and presented high rates of illiteracy18, due to an obsolete education system 
inherited from the Indonesian legacy. As in other past investments, PT would have to allocate 
resources to intensive training and knowledge transfer programs, in order to develop 
technological and business competencies. East Timor presented an additional problem that 
could hinder higher productivity rates in the short term: the language barrier19.     
                                                          
14
 At the time, there were running ferocious negotiations between the Australian and the Indonesian 
government to decide how to share these waters. 
15 At the time, one of the Trust Fund (World Bank) priorities was the development of the power supply 
infrastructure. The investment was currently on going. It was also established that facilities would be 
managed by a public owned company, Electricidade de Timor-Leste.  
16 Nowadays, the road system in East Timor is still very poor. Based on author’s personal experience, the 
minimum required to circulate outside Dili is a 4wd jeep or truck. For instances, the average time range of 
a journey between Dili and the eastern island of Jaco (around 115km) is 7 hours.  
17 Suai is a district in the south coast of the island where was found a big oil reserve. 
18 In 2002, 42,4% of the population did not know how to write or read.  
Source: (http://world.bymap.org/LiteracyRates.html) 
19 Although Portuguese had been recognized as the official language, along with Tetun, only 20% of the 
population (the older layer) spoke the language. 
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Distribution channels were also very different from the reality of developed countries. Within 
the worldwide telecommunication industry, the pre-paid system is the most widely used 
payment method for mobile services. The lack of an efficient banking system in East Timor 
forced PT to deploy alternative distribution channels without the support of traditional ATM 
networks, and tailored to match the existing resources in a developing country20.  
All things considered, Jardim knew that from all the international projects in which he had been 
involved, this would definitely be the most challenging. However, he felt confident about 
previous PT’s experience, that successfully established new telecommunication networks in 
developing countries. During the last years of the millennium, PT’s operations in Africa showed 
the world their ability to implement and improve old telecommunication infrastructures in 
developing economies. PT was involved in the creation of Cabo Verde Telecom, in Cape Verde, 
and Unitel, in Angola, two leading players in their respective markets. Moreover, the recent 
entrance in the Brazilian telecommunications market, through the acquisition of Telesp Celular, 
revealed the strong internalization strategy of the group and a strong operational structure to 
hold multiple international operations. 
 
Dealing with a Transitional Government 
The priority was now to approach the local political and decision leaders, in order to access 
their receptivity to a proposal led by PT. The exclusive operational licence would be provided 
to the BOT applicant who could best meet the financial and operational criteria defined by 
specialists from the World Bank and ETTA. The National Council would have the last word, 
approving the applicant.  
The first topic to be stressed was the period of the concession.  PT’s first proposal was 25 years, 
but Jardim knew that it would be difficult to achieve. An exclusive concession was a decoy to 
attract international telecom companies for such a challenging assignment; however the 
National Council would hardly agree to have a monopoly for this period of time in such a 
strategic sector. Therefore, the new operator would benefit from fifteen years of exclusive 
concession maximum, which could be extendable to ten more depending on its past 
performance.  
The new operator’s equity structure was also in question. ETTA demanded a minimum of 20% 
stake in equity. Additionally, other 10% had to be controlled by Timorese institutions or 
individuals. 
ETTA further requested a social responsible policy, concerning the employee recruitment. The 
concessionaire should give preference to Timorese candidates over foreign ones, unless for 
specific conditions when experienced or specialist professionals were absolutely required. In 
those cases, the operator was authorized to recruit foreign professional or hire foreign 
institutions. The concessionaire would also have to provide constant professional training to the 
Timorese staff.  
                                                          
20 In the telecom industry, distribution channels are all the ways that a telecom player has to provide its 
services to the final user.  
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BOT investment requirements were critical and non-negotiable21. The new operator would be 
responsible for implementing an entire telecommunications network throughout the country, 
connecting all district capitals with fixed line infrastructure and covering specific areas around 
those districts with a mobile telecommunications network. PT estimated an initial CAPEX of 
$20M to $25M dollars, of which $10M dollars were still functioning assets that could be used in 
operational activities.22 The compliance of further investments required in the following years 
suggested that TT would have to support an average revamping or maintenance CAPEX of 15% 
to 20% of revenues, in each year23.  
The most sensitive topic in discussion was the determination of the ceiling tariffs which would 
be charged to customers. The tariffs should be addressed for the entire concession period and 
they were important to outline future operational margins. ETTA asked applicants to propose a 
tariff map considering three factors: price discrimination between business, households and 
charity institutions; tariff ceilings should be benchmarked with the reality of other telecom 
industries in the region; in an earlier stage, the new operator should incentivize the household 
demand for fixed service. The tariff maps would be reviewed periodically by the Regulator and 
the Concessionaire in order to adjust prices with the current inflation of the economy.  
The concession contract would also establish fiscal benefits for the new telecom operator in East 
Timor. During the first years, imported equipment required for operational activity would be 
free of taxes, with the exception of mobile phones. Additionally, the Government would not 
impose any withholding tax over dividends on the future company. 
At the end of his first due diligence session with decision leaders, Jardim felt quite uncertain 
about how East Timor’s former Portuguese political status would influence the success of a 
proposal led by PT. He remembered clearly the day when Eng.º Pedro Braga, the director of 
ETTA’s Infrastructure Department, asked him directly why would a Portuguese telecom be 
interested in such an outlying market. Jardim was straightforward in saying that PT had a clear 
comparative advantage in investing in CPLP24 countries, and at this point, it was already 
decided that Portuguese would be the official language in East Timor.  
Antagonistically, Jardim was confident that PT’s application could also benefit from the 
determinant role that Portugal performed during the independence process and take advantage 
of the strong diplomatic relationships between the two countries kept since then. For instance, 
the future probable leader of the first national government, Mari Alkatiri, had already 
reinforced his support to PT’s application.    
 
 
 
                                                          
21 The results of these negotiations can be found in Exhibit 7. 
22 ETTA announced some functional telecommunications assets around Dili that escaped from the militias’ 
destruction, would be available for the winning applicant. They were valued around $10M dollars.   
23 This assumption was benchmarked with PT’s previous investments in Africa. 
24
 CPLP stands for Comunidade de Países de Lingua Portuguesa, which means the Comunity of 
Portuguese Language Countries. 
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Let the cats appear 
The tender announcement was followed by much speculation around the players interested in 
operating in East Timor. From an economic perspective, it was clear that regional players could 
be interested in the exclusive concession of the fixed and mobile communication services. Their 
operational and execution risk was clearly minimized by their geographical proximity, and 
relative ease in relocating technological and human resources.  
From early on, Australian interest in continuing operations in the East Timorese territory was 
clear. Telstra’s presence in East Timor was already ongoing with two years of exclusive and 
lucrative operations, fed majorly by the needs of the international community. Despite of never 
having invested large amounts in the reconstruction of the telecommunications network during 
this period, the truth was that Telstra had already reallocated resources and staff to East Timor. 
Moreover, the Australian presence created significant political influence among the new East 
Timorese politicians and UN institutions, which could be important to support an eventual 
move from a consortium led by an Australian telecom operator. At the time, Australian 
nationals represented the biggest portion of the international community in East Timor, due to 
the presence of the Australian Army and Australian governmental institutions and NGOs. On 
the other hand, Telstra was being formally accused of enjoying from a monopolist situation 
without any concern about the development of this new nation. International aid organizations 
reported that the lack of investment made in a local wire line or mobile network was ostracizing 
East Timorese citizens, since they could not afford high tariffs practised, nor even the current 
prices of communications’ equipment.  Moreover, the company saw itself in a difficult situation 
when it was revealed that hundreds of East Timorese children were been encouraged to sell 
Telstra pre-paid cards in the streets of Dili.  
There were also rumours about Telkom Indonesia, a state-owned company and the largest 
Indonesian telecom operator, trying to re-enter the Timorese market. However, the recent 
tensions between both countries were a clear handicap for such a move, therefore making a 
joint-venture with a more politically favoured player a better option for Telkom Indonesia. 
 
The Consortium: what solutions?   
On his long way back to Portugal, Jardim had time to review in detail the recent events that 
occurred since he landed in Dili. By what he witnessed, he suspected there was an opportunity 
for PT to achieve a good investment return in East Timor. However, Jardim was aware that 
BOT’s investment and operational requirements were very strict. Therefore, the operational and 
financial success of such a project, within such conditions, would rely enormously on PT’s 
capacity to constitute a solid consortium with valuable strategic partnerships. The hardest task 
was now to find the best combination of forces, among the available options. 
The future consortium would have to strictly follow PT’s Internationalization Model criteria 
(see Exhibit 8) in order to be approved by PT’s board. Following the strategy adopted in 
previous investments in developing countries, PT´s board would also not approve an equity 
stake exceeding 1/3 of the future company’s total equity.  However, BOT requirements defined 
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that the consortium would have to be led by telecom operators, which would assume the 
operational and financial management of the newly created company and the responsibility of 
complying with infrastructure developments.  
PT also knew that Telstra and Telkom were also looking to establish partnerships before 
delivering a formal application. Aligning forces with one of these regional giants was a 
possibility; however, Jardim managed to find other interesting alternatives.  
Vodatel Systems Inc., a company experienced in providing telecommunication infrastructure 
solutions in the People’s Republic of China and listed in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange25, 
presented its interest in joining a consortium led by PT. Vodatel targeted an equity participation 
of 15% to 20% of the future telecom operator.  
During the time spent in East Timor, Jardim also assembled with the national representative of 
Fundação Oriente in East Timor. Jardim had knowledge that Fundação Oriente would be keen 
to support a project that could reinforce the cultural and language link between Portugal and 
East Timor. Therefore, Fundação Oriente was engaged in assuming an equity stake no higher 
than 10%, with the condition that the new telecom operator would have to be composed 
majorly by Portuguese capital.  
“HARII” was the name given to an investment fund created with a 50/50 split between the 
Portuguese government and several Portuguese public/private corporations26. This fund was 
destined to support the creation of new Timorese companies with the potential to contribute to 
the nation’s future development.  Jardim was assured that PT’s future company could be 
financially supported by this fund if necessary, through equity participation27.  
 
From Childhood… 
PT signed the Concession Contract on the 19th July of 2002 with the recently established 
Timorese Government. Timor Telecom (TT) was formally constituted as a Timorese company in 
October of the same year and started operations on the 1st of March of 2003. Eng.º José Jardim 
was nominated CEO of the company and he remained in this position until the end of 2006. 
It was very difficult to present substantial net results in the first years, since the business set up 
phase was complex and challenging.28 As expected, the first years results relied heavily on the 
presence of the international community in East Timor.29 The fixed service was demanded 
mainly by new businesses that started to appear in East Timor and by all the UN, governmental 
and non-governmental institutions. The international personnel were also responsible for the 
initial mobile penetration registered. The adopted strategy was to focus on the best service 
possible in the most economically developed areas, Dili and Baucau, and in the district capitals 
where population concentration was higher. 
                                                          
25
 For more information about Vodatel, see Exhibit 11 
26 At the time, the Portuguese Government hold high equity stakes of the biggest national companies.  
27
 You can find more details about HAIRII and Fundação Oriente in Exhibit 12. 
28 You can check TT’s financial statements in Exhibit 18. 
29 UN’s Information Memorandum pointed for around 15 thousand foreign leaving in East Timor.  
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As expected, East Timor presented numerous operational challenges. The lack of a banking 
system or a national over the counter company30 required that TT’s sales people had to be on 
the streets selling pre-paid airtime credits to customers. Power supply costs represented a great 
portion of TT’s operational costs, since all the network equipment had to be supplied by fuel 
generators.  Maintenance and repair costs were also higher than average, due to adverse 
weather conditions and fragility of a very recent telecommunications network. Additionally, the 
need for experienced top management would result in higher personnel expenses. Jardim 
remembered how difficult it was to mobilize people to the Timor Telecom project, since the 
country was not a pleasant destination for middle aged professionals with an established life in 
Portugal. Intensive training programs were provided to local professionals across the entire 
organization and several key engineers from East Timor visited the Portuguese headquarters 
for advanced knowledge transfer initiatives.   
The firm’s financial health was also supported by the flexibility of some equipment suppliers, 
which worked together with TT as business partners, allowing for extended payment periods. 
The PT’s Group and Vodatel were also TT suppliers, which helped smoothen the investment 
effort.  
Enjoying its position as the exclusive telecom services provider, TT experienced healthy growth 
rate of revenues based on sustained levels of ARPUs31  during the first years of operations.  
 
… to adolescence. 
During the first decade of the millennium, the telecom industry changed dramatically 
worldwide. It experienced exponential growth with new technologies being released within 
short periods of time. The attractiveness of this industry led to the entrance of new players in 
new markets and consequently, decrease in prices. 
Mobile services boomed and rapidly overtook the traditional fixed line services in terms of 
market penetration in the voice segment. Equipment and service prices were driven down and 
consequently lower end customer segments were progressively adopting the mobile service to 
communicate. Additionally, the mobile service was becoming the preferred means of internet 
access in the developing countries, where fixed line networks always lacked the necessary 
quality and capillarity due to decades of underinvestment. 
The political and social environment had deteriorated again in East Timor with the military 
crisis of 200632, which lead to the resignation of the Prime-Minister Mari Alkatiri, who was 
replaced by José Ramos-Horta. 
                                                          
30 For instance, the national chain of supermarkets Circle K sells pre-paid credit recharges from Telkom 
Indonesia to its customers.  
31 Average Revenue per User (ARPU). 
32
 The Timorese army welcomed almost every resistant who fought against the Indonesian forces. When 
the Government decided to reduce the military contingent, militaries came to the streets protesting against 
those cuts. At a certain point, the population joined riots and the problem almost reached civil war 
proportions. Once more, international forces were forced to intervene.  
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The end of 2006, was the time for Timor Telecom to convey a clear message of its commitment 
to the Timorese people. Dr. Manuel Capitão Amaro was the person charged with leading the 
transformation within the company. He replaced Jardim as CEO of TT and his mission was to 
expand the mobile coverage to the entire population by increasing investments in mobile 
network infrastructure and stimulating demand. It was critical that expansion would be 
followed up with increased quality in the service provided.  
TT was still very favourably positioned to enjoy industry changes. It was possible to observe a 
very ferocious “price war” among telecom equipment suppliers with big players trying to enter 
new developing markets. During this period, TT had the opportunity to expand and reinforce 
the national telecommunications network with cheaper and better equipment than at the 
beginning of operations. From 2008 to the present, TT’s CAPEX accumulated levels totalled 
$70M. 
Telecommunication infrastructure was extended aggressively. Mobile network coverage 
jumped from 60% to over 90% of the population with an aggressive roll-out plan that tripled the 
number of base transceiver stations (BTS’s) installed in the country to reach customers in more 
remote and rural areas. At the same time, the core network and the mobile network were 
upgraded to cope with increasing service usage and to improve overall service quality. The 3G 
service was deployed in all District Capitals, providing the population with a mobile internet 
service, and a GPON (fibre) network was deployed in Dili to improve the service quality in the 
capital. 
Distribution channels followed the network expansion. In order to provide service to more 
remote areas, TT expanded the numbers of its distribution agents, which grew from 100 to more 
than 1.000, and ensured a nationwide footprint. Additionally TT opened a network of branded 
stores in all District Capitals, and launched a 24/7 call centre. 
Prices were pushed down to drive service adoption: Mobile prices were progressively reduced, 
with the pre-paid price decreasing from USD 0.25 to USD 0.18 and placing Timor as a reference 
when benchmarked with comparable markets in the region. The prices of SIM cards were 
slashed and cell phones were subsidized to reduce entry barriers and address lower income 
segments. The prices of internet access were also reduced aggressively and Community Centres 
were opened throughout the country to promote internet access in more remote areas. 
It was also after the elections of 2007 and the nomination of Xanana Gusmão as Government 
leader that the political and social stability of the nation was finally achieved. The economy 
experienced double digit annual growth for consecutive years, which clearly stimulated 
demand among the population.  
TT had successfully readjusted its strategic position and revealed completely different numbers 
from what it had showed until 200833.  
 
 
                                                          
33 See Exhibit 23 for a detailed performance of the company since 2008. 
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The Market Liberalization Process  
In 2011 the Government of East Timor issued the National Telecommunication Policy, a 
document that stated the Government intentions to liberalize and to regulate the 
telecommunications sector in the near future.  
Despite all the investment done by TT, especially since 2008, the Government believed that 
competition would drive a positive change in the market, namely helping to further improve 
the current penetration or access levels, the quality of services provided, the reach of network 
coverage and the affordability of service prices especially for internet services. The Government 
reinforced this position by justifying that competitive markets was the natural evolution of the 
telecommunications industry in the world and the only way to achieve the objectives stipulated 
in the Strategic Development Plan 2011-203034.    
The Government stated the intention to assemble with TT’s management in order to review the 
exclusive concession contract signed in 2002. Negotiations between the parties lasted for several 
months and were conducted under a positive and collaborative climate, considering the 
importance of this matter for both the company and the Government of East Timor.  
The Government intended to issue two new operating licences to any international player that 
showed capacity to help achieve the Government’s goals. The Government decided to attribute 
the licenses to two major players in the Asia Pacific Region: Telkom Indonesia and Viettel.35 
The Government’s intention to cease the contract sooner posed some issues that needed to be 
addressed by the parties. In the end the Government renewed the operating license for 15 more 
years and revoked the mandatory transfer of all telecommunications assets to the State, present 
in the BOT contract. This way, TT was guaranteeing that all the investment made during the 
previous years would stay within the company. Moreover, there would no longer exist any 
restrictions regarding the operators’ ownership. From that date onwards, TT’s shareholders 
were free to transfer their equity participation to anyone in the market, unless it disrupted 
competition rules.   
On other hand, The Government established that TT was obliged to share its infrastructure, 
through rental contracts whenever it was physically possible  (most of the towers were 
designed to support only equipment from one operator) and to negotiate interconnectivity 
arrangements in order to allow a working telecommunication service network in the territory.  
On 28th of March 2012, negotiations came to an end and Capitão Amaro signed a new contract 
agreement with the Government. TT would have to face a new reality from that day onwards: a 
competitive world. Despite of all the investment made during the previous years that aimed at 
strengthening the company and staring to prepare it to a liberalized market, there was still 
much to do in order to minimize the impact of two new giants entering in the market. 
 
                                                          
34
 You can found SDP 2011 -2030’s objectives regarding the telecommunication sector in Exhibit 25. 
35 You can find detailed description of these players in Exhibit 26. 
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Exhibit 1 – Map of East Timor 
Source: http://etan.org/timor/1whitepg.htm 
 
Exhibit 2 – Poverty Headcount $1/day (as % of total population)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Timor-Leste Poverty Assessment: Poverty in a New Nation Analysis for Action, World 
Bank , 2003 
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Exhibit 3 – Transcript of Ainaro Site Condition from BOT Sites Survey 
The exchange building and the plant house have been destroyed and need to be demolished 
and rebuilt. All electronic equipment was destroyed. The generator sets have been destroyed, 
the fuel tanks have sustained no visible damage. The tower shows no visible damage. The 
outside cable has benn largely stolen, the poles have not been damaged. 
All weather acess by 2WD. 
Overall condition: Very high damage. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: BOT Sites Survey, ETTA 
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Exhibit 4 - Build Operate and Transfer (BOT) Approach 
The Government grants to a private company the right of develop and operate the new 
telecommunications system for a limited period. The experience of similar contracts in similar 
economies dictates that the operator will benefit of monopoly conditions during the concession 
period, once it starts operations. In counterpart, the operator had to guarantee the 
reconstruction of the national telecommunications system, financing new assets that will be 
transferred for the public entity at the end of the concession period. 
 
 
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Chapter 11: Build-Operate-Transfer for Infrastruture Development – Lessons from the Phillipines 
Experience, Gilberto M. Llanto 
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BOT Contract Timing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Chapter 11: Build-Operate-Transfer for Infrastruture Development – Lessons from the Phillipines 
Experience, Gilberto M. Llanto 
 
Advantages Offered by the BOT Model 
The BOT Model offers a wide range of advantages to both the public and the private sector, 
explaining why it has been so common among infrastructure project financing in developing 
countries36.  
Focusing on the telecommunications sector, the industry has been characterized by a furious 
competition and margin reductions at a global level. Since the beginning of the millennium, 
International telecom players have started to look to developing countries as a way to diversify 
their investment portfolio and seek growth opportunities in less “crowded” markets. Thus, the 
BOT model offers competitive advantages from the state to the private sector, once an alliance 
between both parties arises. Private investors (lenders or equity holders) need the guarantee of 
host governments regarding the stability and predictability of the market they are investing in. 
Host government are able to provide this predictability through licence procedures, regulation 
or concession agreements, minimizing some important risks. 
Commonly, BOT arrangements provide the concessionaire the full operating control of the 
infrastructure, which leads to a more efficient industry.  A consortium of private firms 
responsible for developing and constructing the required infrastructure in order to explore it 
                                                          
36
 The Government of Thailand had also chosen the BOT model to provide a better telecommunication 
infrastructure to its users, in early 90’s 
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later will have higher incentive to design and build it for more efficient and lower costs 
operations, reducing overall investment costs. Moreover, the limited period concession 
specified in the BOT arrangement will force the concessionaire to provide higher quality and 
effective services since an early stage in order to recover cost and profit through consumer 
revenue. Bearing in mind the capital intensive nature of the telecommunications industry, cost 
cutting efficiency carries a high importance. In this sense, Host Governments rest assured that 
technology available from the private sector will be utilized to its maximum potential and put 
in service on the development of nation’s infrastructure.  
As a project finance method, the BOT model allows the complete financing of critical 
infrastructure at a lower cost than if the host government had to seek financing by itself. Host 
governments of these developing countries are usually seen by private lenders as bad debtors 
with high credit risks. The private consortium gives credibility to these projects, enabling  the 
developing countries to receive more favourable credit terms. At the end of the day, BOT 
projects not only enable the development of the economy by receiving foreign investment and 
enjoying from all the advantages of privatization, but also allow host governments to retain 
some control over such strategic sectors. First, the limited concession period and the asset’s 
transfer phase allow host Governments to re-take the lead of operations in the future. Second, it 
is usual to find in BOT contracts a covenant stressing that the host Government will hold an 
equity portion of the project company. Finally, it is also common to see a regulator entity in 
these markets. 
For further research regarding the BOT Model, the author recommends the following37: 
M. Llanto, Gilberto. 2008. “Chapter 11: Build-Operate-Transfer for Infrastruture Development – 
Lessons from the Phillipines Experience”. In International Infrastructure Development in East Asia - 
Towards Balanced Regional Development and Integration – ERIA Research Project Report 2007-2. 
 
M. Llanto, Gilberto. 2008. “A Review of Build-Operate-Transfer for Infrastructure Development:  
Some Lessons for Policy Reform”. Philippine Institute for Development Studies Discussion Pa-
per Series No 2008-25. 
 
J. Sozzi, Christopher. 1996. “Project Finance and Facilitating Telecommunications Infrastuture 
Development in Newly-Industrializing Countries”. Santa Clara Computer & High Technology Law 
Journal, 16 (2): 436 – 487.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
37
 All these sources are available online.  
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Exhibit 5 – The National Constituent Assembly 
On the 22nd of February 2001, the National Council approved the future constitution of the 
National Constituent Assembly. 
It would be composed by 88 members. 
 1 representative deputy per each of the 13 district, elected at a district level. 
 75  deputies elected proportionally at a national level 
The National Constituent Assembly would be responsible for elaborating the First National 
Constitution, where it would be stated the basic foundations of the new Democratic Republic of 
Timor Leste.  
The National Council registered 16 political parties and 16 independent individuals which 
intended to run for this election. In total, there were more than 1.100 candidates for 88 seats 
available in the Constituent Assembly.  
Source:  http://members.pcug.org.au/~wildwood/01junelectoral.htm      
http://members.pcug.org.au/~wildwood/01julconstituent.htm 
 
 
Exhibit 6 – ETTA Information Memorandum38  
This Information Memorandum aims to provide BOT candidates a sense of the East Timor 
reality. The data available prior to this study is very scarce which means that many of the 
presented estimates lack from post confirmation, as soon as better information becomes 
available. 
Population Growth Behaviour 
Until the date, they were made very few population studies covering the eastern part of the 
Timor Island. Nevertheless, the violence featured by the militias had completely changed the 
population movements. During the conflicts, many Timorese were forced to seek refuge in the 
mountains or in the western part of the island and part of them eventually died in the process. 
It was expected that this population returned back to East Timor, but the number was a big 
unknown. In the opposite direction, there was an outgoing movement of a great number of 
Indonesians and Chinese who had been working in the business and political sector. A rough 
estimation points that the East Timorese population is around 800,000 people. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
38 This is a portion of relevant information to the case. More info is available at 
http://www.gov.east-timor.org/old/tenders/20010810im.pdf 
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Estimated Future East Timor Population 
Year 2000 2003 2005 2010 2015 2020 
Dili 132,131 185,635 196,94 225,002 254,569 285,222 
Annual Growth rates for     
previous period 
  12.00% 3.00% 2.70% 2.50% 2.30% 
District Capitals 401,198 389,282 408,192 457,343 509,914 562,986 
Annual Growth rates for      
previous period 
  -1.00% 2.40% 2.30% 2.20% 2.00% 
Rural Districts 246,239 267,508 281,05 316,434 354,537 393,36 
Annual Growth rates for      
previous period 
  2.80% 2.50% 2.40% 2.30% 2.10% 
East Timor 779,568 842,424 886,182 998,779 1.119,02 1.241,57 
Annual Growth rates for     
previous period 
  2.62% 2.56% 2.42% 2.30% 2.16% 
 
It is also expected a concentration of people in and around Dili. Dili is the main economic and 
Administrative center, which means more job opportunities and safety.  
 
The East Timorese Population Age Structure, in 2001 
 
Source: World Bank Data 
 
Future Economic Activity 
The current situation of East Timor makes any forecast about the future economic activity very 
unreliable. The current economic situation is dominated by the following: 
 A completely destroyed vital infrastructure, such as Government and business build-
ings, telecommunications assets, power plants and roads. 
 No permanent Government and no known national policies, aggravated by the lack of 
East Timorese political experience. 
 Doubts related, in the short term, with the East Timorese capacity to lead and drive the 
development of the country. 
 Timor Oil Gap represents a large future government revenue opportunity, but it is un-
certain if it will be well exploited. 
 In the near term, a low taxation base in order to attract foreign direct investment need-
ed for the reconstruction of the economy. 
 The economic importance of the current UN presence in and around Dili.  
 The time presence and effectiveness of the foreign aid.   
49% 
49% 
2% 
0-14 
15-65 
Over 65 
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Taking these issues into consideration, ETTA specialists had arrived to the following forecast: 
Estimated GDP (US$ million) (Base Case) 
Year 2000 2003 2005 2010 2015 2020 
Dili 158.9 232.8 282.9 365.0 448.4 530.6 
District Capitals 53.4 105.8 155.7 244.6 333.5 420.8 
Rural Districts 50.6 59.1 64.3 82.5 101.0 119.9 
National Total 263.0 397.7 502.9 692.1 882.9 1,071.4 
 
 Source: Information Memorandum – Rehabilitation of the Telecommunications Sector in East Timor 
Estimated GDP / Capita (US$) (Base Case) 
Year 2000 2003 2005 2010 2015 2020 
Dili $1,203 $1,254 $1,437 $1,622 $1,761 $1,860 
District Capitals $133 $272 $381 $535 $654 $748 
Rural Districts $206 $221 $229 $261 $288 $305 
National Average $337 $472 $568 $693 $791 $863 
 
Source: Information Memorandum – Rehabilitation of the Telecommunications Sector in East Timor  
ETTA’s specialists had developed an econometric model to forecast the fixed and mobile service 
demand, based on a comparison with countries with similar GDP level in 1998. The sample 
includes India, Azerbaijan and Armenia.  
 
Potential Telephone Demand (in each location)  
Before the turmoil, East Timor registered 6.752 telephones connected by wire line.  
Year 2000 2003 2005 2010 2015 2020 
Dili 5,767 10,308 12,859 20,245 29,364 40,114 
District Capitals 1,935 4,356 6,781 11,860 18,060 25,054 
Rural Districts 1,835 2,175 2,406 3,131 3,892 4,793 
National Total 9,538 16,838 22,046 35,236 51,316 69,962 
 
Source: Information Memorandum – Rehabilitation of the Telecommunications Sector in East Timor 
Mobile telephone demand forecasts are based on statistics from 1998. Since then, there has been 
an explosive growth in the demand for mobile phones due to the increasing perception of 
mobile devices utility. Due to this, ETTA admits that these forecasts can be underestimated.  
Mobile Telephone Demand: East Timor 
Year 2000 2003 2005 2010 2015 2020 
Total Population 779,568 842,424 886,182 998,779 1,119,020 1,241,569 
Total GDP/Cap $337 $472 $586 $693 $791 $863 
Forecast Mobile Demand (/1000 pop) 3.35 4.88 6.00 7.42 8.52 9.61 
Total Mobile Demand 2,610 4,112 5,319 7,501 9,756 11,927 
 
Source: Information Memorandum – Rehabilitation of the Telecommunications Sector in East Timor 
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Exhibit 7 – Aid per capita in post-conflict countries (annual average for the first 5 years 
following the conflict ended) 
  
Population 
(million) 
GDP per Capita 
(current USS) 
Aid per Capita per 
Year (Cuurent USS) 
Azerbaijan 7.8 464 16 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3.7 987 247 
Cambodia 11.4 269 30 
East Timor 0.8 341/a 209 
Lebanon 3.9 1,943 42 
Mozambique 15.8 166 67 
Nicaragua 4.2 425 147 
Rwanda 7.5 226 59 
West Bank and Gaza 2.5 1,433 213 
a/ Non-oil, excluding UNTAET services. 
   
Source: Working Paper nº 2, “The East Timor Reconstruction Program: Sucesses, Problems and Tradeoffs”, 
World Bank  
 
Exhibit 8 – List of country donors (US$ millions), 1999-2002  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Aid to East Timor – Australian Agency for International Development, Audit Report NO. 20 2003-
04, Performance Audit, The Auditor General 
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Exhibit 9 – Negotiation with ETTA specialists. BOT requirements and outputs  
Development Plans 
TT would be responsible to deliver annually a development plan for the following three years 
to the regulator entity. The plan should clearly specify technical and financial details about the 
expansion and improvements of the network, as also improvements of the services provided.  
Geographical coverage  
The fixed wire line network must link all the district capitals and service must be provided to 
any household, business or institution fixed in the city boundaries.   
Regarding the mobile service, the network coverage should be as follow: 
Locations Requirements 
Dili and Ataúro 
The coverage area included the island of Ataúro and the 
region included in 25km radius range from Dili's central 
telecommunications building 
Baucau, Maliana and  Suai 
The coverage area included the region within 7,5km 
radius range from the central telecommunications 
building of each district capital. 
Aileu, Ainaro, Liquiçá, Los Palos, 
Manatuto, Oecussi, Same, Viqueque, 
Ermera 
The coverage area included the region within 4km 
radius range from the telecommunications building in 
each district capital 
Source: Contrato de Concessão do Serviço de Telecomunicações da Reública Democrática de 
Timor-Leste 
At a first stage, the plan intended to cover more than half of population. 
 
Time Schedule  
Due to the economic importance of Dili in the Timorese context, it was discriminated different 
time deadlines for Dili and for the remaining district capitals.  
Dili 
 75% of clients should have access to fixed and mobile services within 5,5 months. 
 100% of clients should have access to fixed and mobile services within 15 months. 
District capitals 
 75% of clients should have access to fixed and mobile services within 12 months. 
 100% of clients should have access to fixed and mobile services within 15 months. 
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Exhibit 10 – PT’s Internationalization Model criteria 
 
Source: Portugal Telecom 
PT leverages intensively on local partners and professionals to manage the international 
operations, supported by comprehensive knowledge transfer programs and sharing of best 
practices. 
 
Exhibit 11 – Transcription from Vodatel’s Company Information Sheet 
“Company name : Vodatel Networks Holdings Limited 
 
Stock code (ordinary shares): 8033 
 
(…) 
 
B. Business activities 
 
Headquartered in Macao and listed on GEM, the Company and its subsidiaries (collectively 
referred to as the "Group") carry the vision to deliver high quality communications infrastruc-
tural solutions to customers, allowing them to manage their business and reach out for infor-
mation, anywhere and anytime. The Group principally engages in the provision of network and 
systems infrastructure and applications, customer network management system (“CNMS”) and 
customized software solutions.  
 
The Group provides an integrated span of services in network and systems infrastructure and 
applications and software solutions, ranging from network and systems planning, design, pro-
vision of equipment and software, installation and implementation to maintenance and tech-
nical support for telecommunications service providers in the People's Republic of China 
("PRC") and enterprises customers in selected vertical markets. In Macao, the Group is also a 
    
26 
 
34% 
3% 
11% 
3% 3% 
11% 
11% 
11% 
13% 
APAD 
GALP 
EDP 
ANA 
IEFP 
PT 
IPE 
leading provider of solutions in structured cabling, surveillance, trucking radio and networking 
solutions for different gaming and hotel operators, governmental authorities and enterprises. 
 
The Group is engaged in the provision of self-developed CNMS for telecommunications service 
providers in PRC, which allows various operators to effectively and efficiently manage the per-
formance of and traffic over the networks. The Group also provides data and environmental 
controlling solutions that allow users to readily and flexibly access, manage and utilize infor-
mation/data and to conduct effective and improved environmental monitoring. The Group also 
designs and builds customized software for its clientele base. 
 
The Group currently has operating subsidiaries in Macao, Hong Kong, Guangzhou and Shang-
hai, providing a full range of products, solutions and support services. The Group also operates 
a service hub from Guangzhou that offers general 24-hour nationwide support services. The 
Group has also established representative offices in different major cities in PRC, namely Bei-
jing, Shanghai, Nanchang, Shenyang, Zhengzhou, Guangzhou, Chongqing and Wuhan, offering 
products/solutions information and local support services.” 
 
Source: Vodatel’s website (http://www.vodatelsys.com/investor_companyprofile.htm#) 
 
Exhibit 12 – Overview of HAIRII and Fundação do Oriente 
HAIRII – Sociedade de Desenvolvimento de Timor Lorossae, SGPS, SA 
In August of 1999, APAD39 created an institution that aimed to materialize the Portuguese 
support for the reconstruction and development of East Timor, designated as “HAIRII – 
Sociedade de Desenvolvimento de Timor Lorossae, SGPS, SA”. The primary goal was allocate 
financial resources that could be invested in major projects related with the development of the 
Timorese economy.  
The social capital of HAIRII amounted 4.5M euros and it was distributed in the following way:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Janus Online 
 
                                                          
39
 Agência Portuguesa de Apoio ao Desenvolvimento (APAD) was created to coodinate the Portuguese 
cooperation with former colonies. It was under the responsibility Portuguese Ministry of External Affairs’ 
responsibility.  
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Most of the capital structure was held by state-owned companies or institutions that operated in 
sectors considered vital to the economy. Their role was to support locally the foundation of new 
companies capable of build and maintain basic infrastructures for the social and economic 
development of East Timor. Later, in 2004, the majority of the capital was alienated to Fundação 
São José, which belongs to Diocese of Baucau and has direct links with the Catholic Church. 
Source: http://www.comissario-timor.gov.pt/quem_somos/quem_somos.asp and Janus Online  
 
Fundação Oriente 
Fundação Oriente was founded in 1988 and aims to provide financial support to all actions that 
can enrich the links between Portugal and the countries in the East, specially China and the 
former Portuguese colonies. These actions often assume cultural, educational, scientific and 
cultural character. 
In East Timor, Fundação Oriente is present since 2000 and it has been granting scholarships to 
Timorese researchers and promoting training and social integration programmes.  
Source: Fundação Oriente web site (http://www.foriente.pt/) 
 
 
Exhibit 13 – TT’s expected Operational Revenues & Costs 
 
Source: Author’s estimates 
 
 
USD '000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Operational Revenues 8.582 10.395 11.965 13.745 11.181 14.260 17.764 24.855 31.300 40.802 46.359 51.331 54.093 57.075
%growth 21% 15% 15% -19% 28% 25% 40% 26% 30% 14% 11% 5% 6%
Sales of Equipment 408              192            159                  174            287            418            464            828            919           1.237        1.369            1.277            1.152            1.224            
%growth -52,87% -17,36% 9,26% 65,39% 45,55% 11,11% 78,42% 10,99% 34,55% 10,72% -6,75% -9,76% 6,25%
Service Rendered Fixed 3.281 3.359 3.619 3.982 2.518 2.684 3.225 5.517 7.141 8.999 9.603 10.563 11.126 11.968
Voice Fixed 1.661          1.700        1.788              1.877        962            1.057        1.231        1.947        2.435       2.818        3.088            3.581            3.878            4.402            
%growth 2% 5% 5% -49% 10% 16% 58% 25% 16% 10% 16% 8% 14%
Market penetration 0,40% 0,40% 0,41% 0,42% 0,41% 0,44% 0,50% 0,90% 1,10% 1,40% 1,50% 1,70% 1,80% 2,00%
Suscribers 3.376           3.456        3.633              3.814        3.816        4.196        4.887        9.015        11.271     14.675      16.085          18.649          20.200          22.927          
ARPU (monthly USD) 41 41 41 41 21 21 21 18 18 16 16 16 16 16
Internet 1.620 1.659 1.831 2.105 1.557 1.627 1.994 3.570 4.707 6.181 6.514 6.982 7.248 7.566
%growth 2% 10% 15% -26% 4% 23% 79% 32% 31% 5% 7% 4% 4%
Market penetration 0,08% 0,08% 0,09% 0,10% 0,08% 0,08% 0,10% 0,20% 0,26% 0,36% 0,38% 0,41% 0,41% 0,44%
Suscribers 675 691 763 877 763 797 977 1.983 2.705 3.816 4.021 4.476 4.646 5.044
ARPU (monthly USD) 200 200 200 200 170 170 170 150 145 135 135 130 130 125
Service Rendered Mobile 4.893 6.843 8.188 9.590 8.376 11.159 14.074 18.510 23.239 30.566 35.387 39.492 41.814 43.882
%growth 40% 20% 17% -13% 33% 26% 32% 26% 32% 16% 12% 6% 5%
Voice Mobile 4.893          6.843        8.188              9.590        8.376        11.159      14.074      18.510      23.239     30.566      35.387         39.492         41.814         43.882         
Market penetration 2,20% 3,00% 3,50% 4,00% 5,00% 6,50% 8,00% 11,00% 14,00% 18,00% 22,00% 25,00% 27,00% 29,00%
Suscribers 18.534        25.921      31.015            36.325      46.532      61.992      78.190      110.178    143.452   188.680    235.913       274.248       303.001       332.442       
ARPU (monthly USD) 22,0 22,0 22,0 22,0 15,0 15,0 15,0 14,0 13,5 13,5 12,5 12,0 11,5 11,0
Operational Costs 6.008 7.276 8.137 9.209 7.715 9.554 11.724 15.410 18.780 23.257 25.497 28.232 29.751 31.391
%growth 21% 12% 13% -16% 24% 23% 31% 22% 24% 10% 11% 5% 6%
EBITDA 2.575          3.118        3.829              4.536        3.466        4.706        6.040        9.445        12.520     17.545      20.861         23.099         24.342         25.684         
Margin (%) 30% 30% 32% 33% 31% 33% 34% 38% 40% 43% 45% 45% 45% 45%
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Exhibit 14 – Assumptions to estimate Free Cash Flows 
Operational Margins were benchmarked with previous PT’s investments in Cape Verde and 
São Tomé e Principe.  
It was considered that telecom assets would depreciate at an average rate of 10%. 
Working capital needs were computed through an industry average ratio. The ratio performed 
was Working Capital over Operational Revenues and the value assumed was -23%. There was a 
revolver credit line of $10M available to face punctual working capital needs, costing 4%. 
It was assumed that BOT requirements and the initial strategy followed by TT would demand a 
reinvestment rate in CAPEX of 15% of Operational Revenues. Due to local credit conditions, it 
was not expected that the new telecom could contract long term debt.  
It was assumed a marginal corporate tax rate of 30%40.  
 
Exhibit 15 – Countries Ratings in 2002 
 
 
Source: Aswarth Damodaran’s website (http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
40
 This was the actual corporate tax in 2001 for the telecom industry. In “Unofficial Consolidation of 
UNTAET Regulation No. 2000/18 as Amended on a Revenue System for East Timor”, 2000. 
Indonesia B3
Papua New Guinea B1
Vietnam B1
Philippines Ba1
Fiji Islands Ba2
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Raw beta D/E Marginal Tax rate
TLKM IJ 1,01 1,57 30%
DIGI MK 1,59 1,28 28%
ISAT IJ 0,95 1,05 30%
TEL PM PHP 0,87 2,41 32%
Exhibit 16 – CDS scale basis points, in 2002  
 
These historical spreads represent an average over previous 5 years.  
Source: Aswarth Damodaran’s website (http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/) 
 
Exhibit 17 – Comparables Information 
 
 
 
 
The author assumed that the best TT’s proxies at the time would be two Indonesian operator, 
Telkom (TLKM IJ) and Indosat (ISAT IJ), the Philippine Long Distance Call (TEL PM) and 
Digicel Malaysia (DIGI MK).  
Raw Betas were taken from Bloomberg. The data encompassed weekly observations of returns 
from each company and from the S&P500 during 3 years, prior to 2002.  
Debt to Equity ratio was also based on Bloomberg information regarding the fiscal year of 2001.  
Marginal tax rate presented were the current ones in 2002. Information was retrieved from 
“KPMG Corporate Tax Rate Survey – January 2002”.  
 
 
 
Rating Country Bond (H)
A1 100
A2 125
A3 135
Aa1 75
Aa2 85
Aa3 90
Aaa 0
B1 600
B2 750
B3 850
Ba1 325
Ba2 400
Ba3 525
Baa1 150
Baa2 175
Baa3 200
Caa 900
Ca 1100
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USD '000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Total Assets 21.948 22.376 21.697 22.711 29.705 38.119 42.011 63.527 86.151
Current Assets 4.324 3.978 5.410 8.631 17.186 18.632 13.405 20.162 20.162
Cash 2.187 674 615 1.951 10.515 10.084 5.250 7.630 6.859
Inventories 76 330 398 507 672 809 1.655 3.793 3.388
Trade Receivables 1.650 2.357 3.846 5.718 4.653 6.888 5.019 6.696 7.758
Other Current Assets 410 618 551 455 1.345 850 1.481 2.043 2.156
Non-Current Assets 17.625 18.397 16.287 14.080 12.518 19.487 28.606 43.366 65.989
Tangible Assets 15.817 17.316 15.888 13.949 12.043 18.836 28.121 42.297 42.177
Intangible Assets 1.808 1.081 399 131 475 651 484 1.068 23.812
Other Non-Current Assets 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Liabilities 17.783 16.145 13.134 10.701 12.982 12.894 13.558 29.898 51.006
Current Liabilities 17.186 14.343 8.907 9.930 12.383 12.164 13.300 19.839 32.897
Interest-Bearing Debt 0 0 3.286 0 0 0 0 7.500 17.851
Other Non-Current Liabilities 597 1.801 941 771 598 730 258 2.559 258
Equity 4.165 6.231 8.563 12.010 16.723 25.225 28.453 33.629 35.145
Shareholder's Equity 4.400 4.400 4.400 4.400 4.400 4.400 4.400 4.400 4.400
Net Income -150 2.065 2.332 3.447 7.261 14.754 17.997 23.173 24.689
Other Reserves -84 -235 1.831 4.163 5.062 6.071 6.056 6.056 6.056
USD '000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010* 2011
Operational Revenues 11.928 16.528 17.246 23.331 31.583 38.484 48.609 57.240 66.382
Sales of Equipment 0 0 304 632 319 631 1.988 928 1.072
Service Rendered 11.928 16.528 17.337 23.387 31.926 38.674 47.593 56.312 65.310
Fixed 5.319 7.027 4.714 5.648 5.990 5.946 5.925 5.283 6.001
Mobile 6.441 8.834 12.093 16.806 24.762 31.630 40.578 50.339 56.902
Other 168 667 530 933 1.175 1.098 1.090 690 2.407
Operational Costs 9.457 9.721 11.715 14.185 17.117 17.845 23.602 24.950 29.390
EBITDA 2.471 6.807 5.531 9.146 14.466 20.639 25.007 32.290 36.992
D&A 1.147 2.503 3.275 4.463 4.065 3.707 4.769 6.564 10.346
EBIT 1.324 4.304 2.257 4.683 10.402 16.932 20.238 25.725 26.646
Financial Income 465 1.147 1.222 253 393 1.307 880 -78 1.079
Financial Expenses 1.570 2.113 547 798 677 1.453 1.121 0 278
Non-Recurrent Items 255 121 -472 -485 -244 393 -28 -101 15
EBT -36 3.217 3.404 4.623 10.361 16.393 20.025 25.748 27.432
Income Tax 115 1.151 1.072 1.336 3.100 1.639 2.028 2.575 2.743
Net Income -151 2.065 2.332 3.287 7.261 14.754 17.997 23.173 24.689
Exhibitt 18 – TT Financial Statements 
Balance Sheet (2003-2011)  
Source: Portugal Telecom 
 
Income Statement (2003-2011) 
 
Source: Portugal Telecom 
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2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010* 2011
Subscribers 22.495      28.307      36.048      52.324      81.314      128.388    354.416    479.569    627.037    
Mobile 20.058      25.722      33.072      49.100      78.215      125.022   350.968   473.020   602.481   
Fixed 1.970        2.082        2.351        2.521        2.457        2.641        2.830        2.999        2.966        
Internet 467           503           625           703           642           725           618           3.550        21.590      
Number BTS Installed 19              23              31              31              33              40              61              98              131            
BTS 3G 8                30              58              
Coverage (% Pop) -              -              -              -              -              - 61% 86% 92%
Exhibit 19 – Timor Telcom Operating performance and Cellular penetration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: http://www.telecomsliberalisation.tl/ 
 
Exhibit 20 – Timor Telecom Parque 
 
 
Source: Portugal Telecom 
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Exhibit 21 – Historical East Timorese Population and GDP annual Growth rates 
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Source: World Bank Data 
 
Exhibit 22 – East Timorese Population Age Structure, in 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank Data 
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Exhibit 23 – Achievements since 2008  
The initial stage was characterized by a great effort to reconstruct telecommunication network 
and provide a reliable service in all segments: fixed, mobile and internet service. After 2008, TT 
entered in an expansion stage in order to accelerate and develop its business. 
Network, Infrastructures and Information Systems 
 Mobile coverage expansion with the construction of 2G Base Transceiver Stations (BTS) 
in rural zones. The objective was reach population not yet covered. From 2008 to 2011, 
TT had triplicated the number of 2G BTS and expanded its potential coverage from 60% 
to 92% of population. 
 Launched the 3G service in all district capitals. 
 Reinforced the mobile network capacity in areas of higher customers’ concentration. Be-
tween 2009 and 2011 the call drop rate (CDR) fell from 2% to 0,1%. 
 Reinforced core network capacity with the construction of SDH rings and fiber optic 
backbone to close the link between all BTS installed in major metropolitan areas. 
 Installed GPON network in Dili, in order to replace the old copper network and pro-
vide a better service in fixed service. 
 Reinforced the connection via satellite to extend the Internet service capacity. 
 Constructed a Data Centre in Dili. 
Distribution Channels 
 Strong expansion of agents’ network in order to ensure higher coverage (nationwide 
footprint). Between 2009 to 2011, agents network grew from 104 to 1.125 sell spots 
spread through all the country. 
 Opened TT over-the-counter stores in all district capitals. 
 Established a new call center functioning 24/7, in order to ensure a personal service to 
final user. 
Marketing 
 Launched the new TT brand, supporting the business growth strategy and aligning the 
company’s values with Timorese identity. 
 Launched new products and services, such as Internet in mobile phones, pre-paid 3G, 
credit transfers between customers, among others) 
 Launched new tariffs to specific market segments. 
 New promotions campaigns offering bonus credit recharges or minutes / SMS. 
 Launched the new web portal www.sapo.tl , with local contents 
Democratization process to ensure higher access to telecommunication services 
 Mobile service prices were progressively reduced. Between 2009 and 2012, pre-paid 
price per minute was reduced from USD 0,25 to USD 0,18. Nowadays, prices are al-
ready a reference when benchmarked with comparable countries in the region (see fig-
ures in next Exhibit). 
 Reduced the minimum value of credit recharge to USD 0,50 lowering the barrier for  
low income customers.  
 Reduced Internet service prices in order to stimulate demand in this segment. 
 Construction of community centers with free Internet access in rural areas.  
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Exhibit 24 – TT and East Timor benchmarked with comparable markets in the South East 
Region. 
Mobile Subscribers in % of total population (2011). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Portugal Telecom 
Mobile service prices (on-net peak tariffs – USD per minute) 
Source: Portugal Telecom 
 
Mobile population coverage (% of total population 2011) 
Source: Portugal Telecom 
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Exhibit 25 – Strategic Development Plan 2011-2030: Strategy and Objectives 
“Our vision is that by 2015, we will have a modern telecommunications network that will connect people 
in Timor-Leste to each other and to the world, and that will allow us to take full advantage of global 
telecommunications advances. To achieve our vision, we will open our telecommunication market to 
competition, establish a new independent regulatory body and introduce Universal Service Policy that 
will dramatically improce access to affordable, reliable and modern telecommunications services.”   
By 2015: 
 Reach mobile phone coverage to all Timorese population by decreasing prices. 
 Allow full acess to high speed Internet services in district capitals and surrounding 
areas. 
 Connect all public schools and health clinics with hifh spped Internet. 
 Establish an effective regulatory framework to manage competition in the market. 
 
Exhibit 26 – Overview of Telkom Indonesia and Viettel 
Telkom Indonesia 
 Telkom Indonesia is the principal telecommunications and media operator in Indone-
sia. The state holds an equity stake of 52% and the remaining is hold by privates.  
 It is the biggest Indonesian company listed on stock exchange ($19,7B on the 11th No-
vember 2012). It is listed simultaneously in NYSE, LSE and IDX. 
 It offers a large range of telecommunications services, namely voice service (fixed and 
mobile), Internet service, pay TV, BPO, among others. 
 Telkom Indonesia’s international investments are managed and controlled by Tellin, 
which is a subsidiary 100% held by Telkom Indonesia. 
 Tellin is present in several countries in the South East Asia.  
 It expects to reach a 43% market share in East Timor by 2017. 
Viettel 
 Viettel Telecom Company is the major telecommunications operator in Vietnam and it 
is 100% held by the State and controlled by the Ministry of Defense. 
 In 2011, revenues increased 28% reaching $5,6B and net profit was $1B. 
 All international investments are managed by Viettel Global, which is held by Group 
Viettel. 
 Viettel has around 60 million customers spread through 6 countries where operates ( 
Vietnam, Laos, Haiti, Mozambique and Peru). 
 The Group plans to spread its presence in a total of 15 countries until 2015 and enter in 
the top ten biggest telecommunications operator worldwide. The Group wants to cover 
around 500 million people until the same year. 
 Their internationalization strategy focus on a strong investment in telecommunications 
networks (BTS and fiber optic), especially in rural areas where mobile coverage is weak 
and penetration is low. 
 They provide telecommunication services at very low prices comparing with other 
players and provide special tariffs to users with low income.  
 In all international operations, Viettel offered free Internet services to public schools. 
Source: Portugal Telecom presentation “Overview Telekom Indonesia” and “Overview Viettel”; Tellin 
website (http://www.telin.co.id)  and Viettel website (http://www.viettel.com.vn/Home.html). 
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                NOVA SCHOOL OF BUSINESS & ECONOMICS 
 
Teaching Notes – Timor Telecom Case Study: Ten Years of Experience 
The “Timor Telecom: Ten Years of Experience” case study is about the life of Timor Telecom 
from inception to present days. The case is divided in two distinct phases. Prior to 2003, the case 
refers to PT’s decision to invest in a telecom operation in East Timor (which is the case’s main 
focus) and after it describes the monopolistic operating activity which endures to the present, in 
order to confront the student with a recent market transformation: the market liberalization 
imposed by the government. 
Therefore, this case study is a great opportunity for students: 
 To study an investment opportunity in an emerging economy such as the East 
Timorese, characterized by a context of great uncertainty; 
 To familiarise themselves with the Build Operate and Transfer model, which was a very 
popular project financing model used to develop strategic sectors in emerging coun-
tries; 
 To understand the major risks involved in a telecom project in an emerging market and 
possible mitigation strategies; 
 To understand how competition can promote further development of the telecommuni-
cation sector.  
Suggested Questions: 
1. Within the BOT framework, please identify the major risks involved in PT’s decision 
to invest in East Timor.  
2. Bearing in mind the constraints and requirements made both PT’s board and the East 
Timorese Government, what would you advise regarding the composition of the 
consortium and the equity structure of the new telecom? Among the options avail-
able, who were the best partners to constitute a winning proposal? How would they 
be important to mitigate the risks that you had previously identified?  
3. Perform your own valuation of the project and provide sufficient detail. Would you 
go for it? Discuss the different valuation models you found suitable for valuing this 
project (WACC vs. APV). Would you incorporate Country Risk premium? If yes, 
please explain at least two different alternatives to estimate this premium.  
4. Imagine that you were invited to the meeting scheduled by Mr. Capitão Amaro. You 
were asked to elaborate a detailed report about the future consequences of the tele-
communications liberalization in East Timor. What would you report? What would 
be your strategic advice in order to smooth the impact of the new players’ entrance? 
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The Build-Operate and Transfer Approach  
Governments have traditionally been in charge of providing the needed conditions that lead to 
the social and economic development of nations. Looking at the past of East Asia countries, we 
have seen the public sector concerned with the construction and development of infrastructures 
considered critical for population’s welfare, such as a national electric network, a national 
telecommunications network, among others... However, public sector has allowed the 
participation of private investment in the construction and operation of those infrastructures, 
for the following reasons: 
 It is possible to price those non-pure public services and avoid free rider behaviour 
among users, meaning that private entities can receive a return on their investment41. 
 Governments cannot afford investment requirements of such capital intensive indus-
tries; 
 Private players possess the required managerial and technical resources to develop in-
frastructure in a more effective way; 
 Innovations in technology allow benefits from vertical unbundling in strategic sectors; 
 Multinational players can easily provide a service according to international standards, 
which facilitates the international competiveness of these economies; 
 Governments have a powerful tool to align private and public interests, which is regu-
lation. 
The BOT model can be defined as: 
“A private party or concessionaire retains a concession for a fixed period from a public party, 
called principal (client), for the development and operation of a public facility. The 
development consists of the financing, design and construction of the facility, managing and 
maintaining the facility adequately and making it sufficiently profitable. The concessionaire 
secures a return on investment by operating the facility and, during the concession period, the 
concessionaire acts as an owner. At the end of the concession period, the concessionaire 
transfers the ownership of the facility free of liens to the principal at no cost”.42 
The BOT approach has been seen as the most effective way to finance concessionary projects, 
characterized by being very capital intensive. Therefore this project finance model was used in 
numerous important and strategic projects which contributed for the development of various 
countries in East Asia.  
In the last decades of the second millennium, the telecom markets in developed countries did 
not present a high prospective of growth and were overcrowded with competitors. The BOT 
model represented an opportunity for international telecom players to enter into these growing 
and populous markets which have historically been kept under the national governments’ 
control. Moreover, the constant technological evolution and increasing competition among tech 
suppliers was driving down industry prices. Telecom operators were in position to benefit from 
cheaper and better technology in this mission to conquer unexplored markets. The clearest 
                                                          
41 For instance, national defense is a pure public service since it is not possible to charge a fee for its use. 
42
 Verhoeven (1995) as cited in Menheere and Polais (1996).  
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example of the industry development was the wireless networking system. The mobile phone 
introduction represented an opportunity for operators to cover higher portions of territory with 
smother investments in the network. This was critical to achieve higher and quicker returns 
which could be reinvested in further development.  
In the end of the twentieth century, the wireless networking system was clearly substituting the 
wire line telephone system in the broadband due to a greater utility and also because wireless 
networks were cheaper and easier to construct (see Exhibit 1).  
 
The Risk Assessment of PT’s investment in East Timor  
In 2000, the information available on the current economic, social and political outlook of East 
Timor was clearly insufficient. Therefore, the local due diligence performed by Jardim and his 
team assumed a critical role during the investment decision process in order to understand 
possible risks and constrains that a telecom operator would face in East Timor.  
This chapter of the Teaching Note aims to point out the expected risks of investing in an 
emerging market, naming the specific risks that a new telecom would have to face in East 
Timor.  Risks will be allocated in four risk categories – Host-Country Risks, Economic / 
Financial Risks, Technological / Operational Risks and Social Risks – in order to provide a 
better understanding of possible consequences to the project.   
Host-Country Risks 
This category assembles risks related with the host country’s political environment and its 
general legal and regulatory framework.  
Investors rank political risks as the biggest barriers to the successful settlement of new 
investments in emerging markets (see Exhibit 3).  One widely quoted description of an 
emerging market emphasizes how important is the political risk assessment before the 
investment decision: 
“An emerging market is the one where politics matters at least as much as economics.”43  
Due to various reasons, emerging markets tend to have weak and unstable political institutions, 
which often lead the decision power to unrepresentative elites. In such conditions, legal and 
regulatory framework could be drafted and applied according to minority interests, meaning a 
very unstable and unpredictable operating environment.  
East Timor presented in 2000 a very unstable political situation without a democratically elected 
Government in place and neither an established general legal and regulatory framework. For 
the majority of investors, it was unthinkable to invest in a country in such uncertainty. The 
country was being governed by a UN’s Transitional Administration and social order was 
maintained by foreign military forces. Therefore, an obvious potential risk was the political 
violence which might follow post-election periods or other important political moments. There 
                                                          
43 Ian Bremmer, in Harvard Business Review (2005) 
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was no guarantee of safety in such scenario, especially when the foreign presence could be seen 
as a sovereignty threat. History had already revealed the inability of new born democratic 
governments to maintain order and peace during these periods. 
Jardim was also concerned about the future political governance and its competency. It was 
crucial for the desired development of the nation to have a stable democratic regime in which 
different political parties and leaders would respect a strategic plan and would honour 
previous government treaties. However, the East Timorese people were used to living under 
foreign sovereignty and had never been politically educated to live under a democratic regime. 
The democratic dialogue had never existed, neither the freedom of expression. Usually, 
leadership was personified by the tribal chief, by the local Catholic leader44 or by the leaders of 
the resistance against the Indonesian occupation45. Also, East Timor presented a very serious 
lack of qualified personnel, unable to assume political roles. This was a major political risk that 
could lead the country drowning in problems related with corruption, political influences, 
mismanagement and resources misallocation.  
The first elections for the Constituent Assembly were crucial to reveal the political maturity of 
the East Timorese people and their willingness to develop the country through a democratic 
path. The UN institutions and forces were there to help creating a stable political environment 
in an initial stage, but then these “novices” would have to assume the political leadership of the 
country.  
The new telecom operator would also be exposed to a set of regulatory risks. The Concession 
Contract would have to clearly specify the exclusive concession period and the initial 
investment and operational conditions. Along time, investment and operational requirements 
would be reviewed according to the upward evolution of the nation’s economic and social 
performance. New milestones would be negotiated between the new operator’s board and a 
new “independent” regulatory body46. Jardim knew that very detailed industry regulation 
performed by an inexperienced “independent” regulator could harm the profitability of the 
project. Moreover, the potential regulatory walks hand in hand with political orientation. A 
dramatic change in the political leadership could change regulation and threaten the operations’ 
sustainability.   
The worst scenario possible would be the rising of a new authoritarian government demanding 
the full control of this strategic sector. In such scenario, the privately owned telecom operator 
would face a serious nationalization constraint, which could result in creeping expropriation 
without any financial compensation.   
 
 
                                                          
44
 At the time, Dom Ximenes Belo was bishop and leader of the East Timorese Church. He was very 
influent among the population.  
45
 Many of the existent politicians who formed the National Council and then founded political parties 
were former leaders of the Timorese resistance, without any political background or academic 
qualifications. 
46 Private investors usually see the creation of independent regulation bodies in emerging economies as a 
host government attempt to maintain control over a strategic sector. 
    
40 
 
Economic / Financial Risk 
The economic climate in the host country is seen as one of the most important variables to 
determine the extent to which the built infrastructure is put to use, and thereby, the profitability 
of the infrastructure service provider. This is even truer within the Telecommunications Sector, 
where the private service providers plan on recovering their investment through tariffs paid by 
the final consumer. Therefore, telecom operators are truly dependent of consumers’ capacity in 
purchasing their services.  
Thus, a telecommunications venture in East Timor would be highly exposed to a significant 
cash flow risk. The World Bank released a poverty assessment report, stating that 20% of the 
East Timorese population lived with less than one dollar per day in 2002 (see Exhibit 1 and 2). 
Moreover, these indicators had been worsening since 1999 and there was a big uncertainty 
regarding the nation’s capacity to develop its economy.  
The economic development, translated in an upward evolution of the East Timorese GDP, was 
dependent of numerous macroeconomic factors.  
The future wealth of the country would rely heavily on the existent natural resources, namely 
on oil and gas reserves located in the East Timor Sea. In 2001, their sovereign jurisdiction over 
offshore territories was still being negotiated with neighbour countries (Indonesia and 
Australia). This was a sensitive topic, since Australia was one of the top foreign aiders and 
Indonesia was a giant economy in the region. There was little negotiation margin to the recent 
East Timorese leaders.  
On other hand, from the moment that an economy becomes excessively dependent on oil 
revenues, the blessing of possessing relative abundant natural resources can easily turn into a 
curse. Based on the experience of other natural resources exporters, the future government can 
easily fall on the temptation of over-spending, which would raise the relative price of services 
and goods (increasing inflation) and draw resources away from the non-oil traded goods sector, 
delaying its development. Government spending could also easily exceed capacity to absorb, 
reducing the public investment efficiency. Moreover, the volatility of revenues promotes 
unstable public investment patterns making the economy more prone to business cycles.   
At an initial stage, it was also expected that foreign aid could boost the economic and social 
development of the nation. However, corruption and bribes were common and could deviate 
aid from its initial purpose: the economic and social development of the nation.   
Another pressing concern was the macroeconomic effect related with the departure of UN 
institutions and much of the expatriate community. At the time, there were no certainties about 
how much longer UN would stay in East Timor47. However, it was certain that UN’s departure 
would result in loss of employment and income to the East Timorese economy. It would also 
mean a great loss of technical expertise. After the arrival of foreign military forces and later on 
the arrival UN administrative personnel, the business and support services sectors were 
                                                          
47 UN planned to stay more two or three years, according to the Information Memorandum released 
during the launch of the BOT tender. 
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boosted by the high purchasing power of the expatriate community. Prices were indexed 
accordingly with foreigner’s income.  
UN departure was a sensitive topic in PT’s business plan. The new telecom operator would 
only benefit with the extension of the international community’s presence. (See next chapter). 
East Timor adopted the US dollar as official currency, based on the UN advisory. The reasoning 
behind this decision relied on the urgency of a stable and well accepted currency in the global 
markets. A strong and stable currency would partly hedge the risk of high annual inflation, 
which was likely in periods of high GDP growths. Moreover, the East Timorese economy would 
need a general accepted currency to enhance international trade and Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI)48, which was critical to the reconstruction of strategic infrastructure. Obviously, the flip 
side would be the lack of future exporting competitiveness against regional players. However, 
the most likely exported good was oil, which was negotiated in international markets in US 
dollars per barrel.   
As a matter of fact, the future telecommunication carrier would benefit from the circulation of a 
strong currency in East Timor. It would have more power to negotiate interconnection tariffs 
with neighbour telecom carriers, which operate with weaker currencies. This was an important 
topic considering that international calls would compose a great portion of first years revenues, 
due to international community’s presence. 
The last but not least important risk that the new telecom would have to bear in East Timor was 
the lack of debt providers willing to finance the future growth needs of the company. Local 
financial institutions were still giving the first steps in East Timor49, and commercial lending 
was still incipient. As a result, the expansion and improvements of the telecom network would 
be dependent on successful cash flow generation and shareholder loans.  
In order to develop an economy resilient to the economic impact of UN’s departure and not 
wholly dependent on oil and aid, the macroeconomic challenge was to enhance the private 
investment climate, and consequently attract more Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), foster the 
development of non-oil traded goods sectors and increase productivity and employment levels 
of those sectors. 
 
Technical / Operational Risk 
The challenge of building an almost completely new telecommunications network within the 
deadline stipulated by ETTA in a country like East Timor was huge. However, it was not less 
challenging than the objective of running operations in a profitable and effective way, in 
accordance with international quality standards. Therefore, it is reasonable to separate risks 
according to the different stages of the project. The execution risk gathers all the possible 
constraints and problems during the construction phase of the new broadband network, as also 
                                                          
48 The option for the US dollar currency was a much stronger guarantee against vertiginous devaluations 
of a national currency, which were probable to occur in periods of high inflation.  
49 At the end of 2000, the Banco Nacional Ultramarino (BNU) was the single financial institution in East 
Timor.  In 2001, the Australian ANZ won a license to start providing banking services.  
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during revamping and expansion phases. The operation risks would be the ones faced by the 
new operator’s management during the operational activity. 
Jardim was aware of the challenge. East Timor presented a set of characteristics that had never 
been addressed together on previous PT international investments. First of all, the natural 
characteristics of the country were by themselves a real constraint. The north and south shore of 
the Timor Island is divided by a high range of mountains. Although most of the population was 
concentrated in the north shore of the island (Dili and Bacau), ETTA required the same 
development commitment in other regions of the island.50. Thus, the natural characteristics of 
the island led to the isolation of some regions, a problem worsened by the lack of road 
maintenance. Poor roads through a very rugged territory would definitely hinder the access of 
the needed materials and equipment to construct the network in remote zones. The risk of 
personal and material accidents was considerably high. Dili’s port facilities were also very 
rudimental, which could delay the arrival of crucial imported goods and materials. Finally, the 
tropical climate with an extended raining season and the lack of assets’ security would also 
impose a great replacement CAPEX capacity to the future operator, in order to maintain the 
network constantly functional.  
Managing and running telecom operations in East Timor would certainly not be a “walk on the 
beach”. There were serious operational issues that must be addressed before signing the 
commitment with ETTA.  
The current status of the power supply infrastructure was worrying. The power grid was 
currently being subject to reconstruction and expansion according with the priorities of the 
Trust Fund, but Jardim knew that the telecommunication infrastructure could not rely on the 
national power supply grid. The consequences would be constant power breakdowns and the 
interruption of mobile telecommunication services. The solution would be equipping all sites 
and BTSs with fuel power generations, which means a very costly operational expenditure.  
Human resources were also of top concern. ICTs related industries need qualified human 
capital. Even operating under monopolistic conditions, a telecom carrier would always need 
qualified staff. Those are indispensable to deal with technical and business specificities of a 
telecom operation. However, qualified staff was a scarce resource in East Timor. The population 
presented high rates of illiteracy due to a very low quality educational system.  Despite being a 
fairly inexpensive manpower, East Timorese workers would take a lot of time and resources to 
learn the fundamentals of the industry. The language barrier would certainly hinder the 
training process, since the majority of the active work force did not speak a minimum of 
Portuguese.  
Moreover, the qualified staff required to assume leadership positions would represent costly 
resources to the firm. Delivering the control of the firm in the hands of nationals was unlikely, 
meaning that Jardim would have to find a team of expatriates to run operations. The problem 
was that East Timor did not seem a very pleasant place to live and work at the time, due to lack 
of security and general life conditions. 
                                                          
50 The initial investment milestones within the Concession Contract demanded that all district capitals 
must be connected by wire, within the broadband. 
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The new telecom carrier would also have to find the best distribution channel to reach clients. 
In the beginning of the millennium, telecom operators in emerging markets relied on different 
pre-paid systems to sell telecommunication services. Credit was only given to the biggest and 
most reliable clients, such as corporations or the government.  
The pre-paid system would have to be forcibly imposed in East Timor, due to the high credit 
risk. The main question was how to deliver a pre-paid system without incurring in a great loss 
of income? A possible solution was hiring distribution agents, who were responsible to 
organize external outsourced work force in teams. These teams would be spread all over the 
country, selling pre-paid airtime credits to future clients. The main problem would be find 
trustable distribution agents among population. 
Social Risks 
At an initial stage, it was important for PT to gain the confidence and the acceptance of the 
Timorese community. There was a residual concern about how would the population interpret 
PT’s investment move.  
Would PT be accused for trying to step in East Timorese market with political intentions? 
Would PT be really be concerned with developing an affordable and accessible 
Telecommunication Sector to the East Timorese?  Or was PT only interested in exploiting its 
monopoly during the following fifteen years? 
Therefore, Jardim was aware that the new telecom operator would have to be sensitive to the 
population’s needs; otherwise it would face serious reputational problems. As sole service 
provider, the new telecom carrier must be commercially profitable but also aware that it would 
play a crucial role in the nation’s development.   
 
The Risk Mitigation Tools 
Once the risks have been identified, Jardim and his team would now have to think the best 
ways to mitigate or share part of the operations’ risk potential.  
A Concession Contract under the BOT Model 
The BOT tender showed publicly the host government’s interest and commitment to engage 
with private players in the mission to develop the telecommunications network in East Timor. 
Partnering with host governments is considered crucial to an investment project’s success in 
emerging markets (see Exhibit 3). Private investors seek some market stability which could be 
provided by governments through regulation, licences, or concession agreements.  
In our case, the Concession Contract was itself a fundamental tool to mitigate part of the risks 
inherent to the project. Despite all the uncertainty around the future political leadership of East 
Timor, the Concession Contract was an official document ratified by the United Nations. It 
guaranteed an exclusive concession licence to perform telecom operations for an extended 
period in East Timor. This was a significant safety cushion for interested investors, since they 
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knew that all new future democratic governments would have to respect this contract until the 
end of the concession period51. Nevertheless, it was truly important to sustain good 
relationships with all political parties and players (Governments and opposition) because, at the 
time, they exercised a tremendous influence on public opinion.  
Moreover, the concession contract also offered a range of conditions that would ease the 
construction of the network, and consequently it would minimize the investment’s execution 
risk. The future telecom carrier would benefit from tax exemption over imported goods and 
equipment needed to develop the network. Moreover, the firm would also be legally authorized 
to install sites and stations wherever it found most appropriate to maximize the efficiency and 
the operability of the network.  
The exclusive concession licence was an obvious decoy used by ETTA and the National Council 
to attract private capital and expertise, since it would protect the new venture from market 
competition. Even if the economic outlook remained uncertain and it was not possible to 
forecast precisely the pattern of telecommunication services demand, the concession contract 
guaranteed that all market growth potential would be enjoyed by the new operator, minimizing 
the cash flow risk. 
The Consortium  
The most preferred strategy of private investors to hedge against possible risks in emerging 
markets is using joint venture or alliances with local companies (see Exhibit 3).   
The reality of East Timor was the proof of this evidence. One of BOT model’s core fundamentals 
is to encourage the sharing of risks among different players. The main question was how to 
draw the most valuable partnership which would maximize the new telecom’s future and the 
return on investment made by PT. Jardim’s final decision would have to bear simultaneously 
the constraints imposed by PT’s board, the government’s requirements and, at the end of the 
day, it would have to convince ETTA’s specialists that the whole Consortium was truly 
committed in developing the Telecom Sector in East Timor. 
Jardim was uncertain about what would be the best way to address this crucial question. He 
pictured two possible alternatives in his mind in order to comply with constrains imposed both 
by the board and the ETTA.  
A joint venture? 
Jardim considered a possible partnership with an international telecom carrier, potentially 
interested in joining a venture with PT. Checking the list of constraints, there were no 
limitations regarding a joint venture possibility. Since 30% of the future telecom’s equity was 
already “booked” by ETTA’s requirement, entering in a fifty-fifty joint venture would comply 
                                                          
51 Except if market conditions or needs would demand the cession of the contract. This was what 
happened in 2010, when the East Timorese Government decided to liberalize the market in order to boost 
industry’s development. We will discuss this topic further in this Teaching Notes.   
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with the board’s constraints52. On the other hand, ETTA did not have any limitations regarding 
two telecom players leading the future national telecom.  
Although no public expression of interest had been showed, Jardim’s due diligence concluded 
that Telstra and Telkom were studying the possibility of stepping in the East Timorese market. 
Consequently, these two international telecoms could be suitable alternatives to partnership 
with.  
Telstra was the “incumbent” operator in East Timor since UN restored the peace in the country. 
They were providing telecom services on a temporary basis. Telstra had not committed any 
substantial investment in the network’s development until then and the service through satellite 
connection was very expensive. The biggest advantage of joining in a partnership with Telstra 
was the fact that this firm was already established with own resources in East Timor. The 
accumulated knowledge about the market and about its dynamics during the past three 
operating years in East Timor would be critical to develop a sound strategic plan, minimizing 
the execution and operating risk of the new telecom venture. The experience also revealed the 
technical quality of its staff, since they managed to turn existent telecom assets left by 
Indonesians into operational ones.  
However, there were some drawbacks that could threat this partnership. In the first place, there 
was an increasing social dissatisfaction regarding Telstra’s activities in East Timor. Due to high 
tariffs imposed in mobile broadband services (which were the only possible connection between 
districts), the population did not have the means to afford telecom services.  The international 
community, mainly NGOs, started accusing the company of being only commercially focused 
on enjoying its status as a single service provider. Additionally, Telstra had recently faced 
embarrassing accusations regarding the use of local child labour in its distribution channels. 
Although Telstra’s recent past could have a negative impact on the final tender’s decision, the 
rising Australian political influence among the recent East Timorese politicians could yield an 
opposite decision. Australia played an important role to cease the conflict in East Timor sending 
military forces and it was one of the leading country donors.  
The alternative partnership would be another regional telecom giant: Telkom Indonesia. The 
state owned company was the biggest telecom services provider in Indonesia, a country 
composed by hundreds of habited islands. In fact, Telkom was the single service provider in the 
western part of the Timor Island and in neighbour islands, which have similar natural 
characteristics.  
Telkom would be a valuable partner in constructing the network. Its local expertise in 
constructing a national network through all Indonesian islands would be a guarantee of 
efficiency. They had experience in settling networks in rugged islands, with lack of 
infrastructures. Additionally, its regional dimension would certainly provide a bigger 
negotiation power dealing with equipment suppliers. These both factors combined were a 
guarantee of a smother CAPEX and compliance with ETTA’s timing requirements. 
                                                          
52 PT’s equity participation would be 35% in this case, it was roundly the 1/3 limitation imposed by the 
board. By other hand, the selection criteria was in accordance.  
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The partnership with Telkom would also guarantee numerous operational advantages. 
Provided with an abundant, relatively cheap and increasingly educated work force, Telkom 
could guarantee lower operational costs in exchange of quality services. The language barrier 
would also be easier overpassed increasing the effectiveness of training provided to local 
employers. Commercially, the new telecom carrier would also have more negotiation power to 
deal with other regional carriers, regarding interconnection costs and access to worldwide data.  
All things considered, Telkom’s solution would benefit the new venture’s penetration in the 
East Timorese market, since it was possible to deliver the service at more affordable prices to 
the final consumer. 
However, the memories and wounds of the Indonesian legacy in East Timor were still fresh. 
Despite all the economic and operational advantages of partnering with Telkom, PT knew that 
this would be a politically handicapped solution. The probability of East Timorese accepting an 
Indonesian player among the leaders of the national reconstruction was almost zero.  Moreover, 
Telkom was a leader state owned company in a large country such as Indonesia, which could 
hinder the joint governance of the new telecom. Finally, there was a huge risk of local 
community seeing this partnership as a joint effort of two former colonizers in resuming their 
economic and political influence in East Timor.  
Or looking for exclusive control? 
The alternative to entering in a joint venture was drawing a governance scheme in order to 
comply with PT’s board requirements. If the option was to fully control and assume full 
responsibility over the future firm, PT would theoretically have to undergo more than half of 
the firm’s equity, which was not compliance with superior requirements. The alternative was to 
create a financial vehicle with other players, in which PT would have a majority position. On its 
turn, this financial vehicle would hold a major equity participation in the future telecom 
company, allowing PT to have full control.  
As referred in the case, Jardim’s local due diligence encountered possible alternatives matching 
this model perfectly. None of them were interested in assuming the operational management, 
which should be addressed by PT. 
Sociedade HAIRII, the Portuguese public investment fund, was created with the intention of 
strengthening the economic relationship between Portugal and East Timor and to reinforce the 
Portuguese commitment in supporting the nation’s development. In PT’s perspective, the fund 
would provide political strength to the application and ease relationships with future political 
leadership. 
Fundação Oriente was eager to financially support PT’s project. Their mission of reinforcing 
Portuguese linkages to former colonies in the East was mirrored in such investment, mainly 
financed by Portuguese capital. Moreover Fundação Oriente would represent the future social 
awareness of the firm. Its association with the project would create a positive impact among the 
local community as also would help the future firm in recruiting the best local workforce.  
Vodatel Systems Inc. was a key partner in PT’s standalone application. As previously referred, 
the credit conditions in East Timor were very difficult which emphasized the importance of 
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finding a partner capable of ease the initial investment effort. Vodatel was growing in several 
Asian markets, as a top provider of telecom network solutions. Their accumulated expertize 
would certainly add value to the project, especially during the design and construction phase of 
the network. Additionally, Vodatel had an extensive network of contacts with regional 
equipment suppliers (mainly Chinese and Japanese), which would be critical to ease the access 
to better credit conditions and dismiss leveraging. 
In what concerns the daily operational life of the future telecom company, the standalone 
application would require the future management team to have the needed flexibility and 
experience to overpass operational challenges.  
The 10% of equity saved for national institutions or individuals would have to be distributed 
aiming further risk mitigation. The lack of existent business corporations in East Timor would 
force the distribution among individuals. Therefore, it was important to select local business 
people able to intercede for the future company’s interests. 
 
Investment’s Financial Assessment 
Timor Telecom’s case study reveals to be a great opportunity for finance students to learn about 
valuing investment projects in an Emerging Market. Despite all the risk mitigation tools 
discussed above, a specific investment in East Timor bore a high risk profile that should be 
taken into account when assessing its economic viability.  Although students are not asked to 
provide specific sales and costs forecasts for the concession period, the document explains how 
those can be forecasted in such a context53 and then proposes a Discounted Cash Flow Model in 
order to include the country’s risky profile in the project’s valuation.  
Estimating Future Free Cash Flows  
PT’s application was awarded with a telecommunications licence of fifteen years, meaning that 
the business plan should forecast cash flows for the same period range. Since the negotiations 
with the Timorese Government occurred during the year of 2002 and a period of fifteen months 
was stipulated for building the network, sales revenues should be forecasted between 2003 and 
2016.  
Operational Revenues Forecast  
Timor Telecom would render a limited type of services within its national broadband. The fixed 
service encompassed the wire line connection telephone and Internet through dial up, while the 
mobile service would offer voice and the short message system (SMS). At the time, those were 
the range of possible services to offer in East Timor. 
                                                          
53 The following estimates were performed by the author. 
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In 2001, the telecommunications industry was changing. The industry was moving towards the 
mobile broadband at the expense of fixed services, especially in developed countries (see 
Exhibit 4). The business plan took this trend in consideration despite the information available.54   
Sales forecasts were based on the expected monthly Average Revenue per User (ARPU) and 
expected market penetration of each service, bearing in mind that both value drivers were 
dependent on the economic and social performance of the nation.  
It is also important to refer that it was considered a scenario in which UN personnel would end 
their mission in East Timor at the end of year 2006, creating a negative impact in TT’s sales 
during the following year. 
Mobile Service 
The strong presence of the international community in East Timor was expected to support 
telecom revenues during the first years of operations. The demand for mobile services was 
clearly dominated by foreigners who used mobile devices for professional and personal 
purposes. It was reasonable to assume that 80% of 15 thousand foreigners living in East Timor 
in 2001 would use a mobile device. During the first years of operations, expected mobile ARPU 
would be driven accordingly with foreign purchasing power. Since the majority of the 
international community in East Timor were Portuguese, Australians and Singaporeans, it was 
reasonable to look over ARPUS (2001) in these countries in order to understand how much they 
were willing to pay (see Exhibit 5). However, monthly ARPU should be reduced to levels which 
permit a portion of East Timorese population consumes the services. Benchmarking with the 
Indonesian ARPU, the initial ARPU was fixed at $22.  Regarding the starting market 
penetration, the author assumed that the new telecom would enter with a 2,2% penetration, 
considering  only 0,8% of Timorese demand55.  
As referred in the case, BOT requirements demanded that network capacity must cover 50% of 
the Timorese population during the concession period. Nevertheless, it was not predictable 
achieving such market penetration due to the economic constraints lived by the Timorese. 
Therefore, the business plan was elaborated under a conservative scenario of reaching only 30% 
of market penetration at the end of the concession, after a progressive increase. It is important 
to refer that almost half of the East Timorese population was under the age of 14 and therefore 
non potential consumers. As market penetration increased along the years, the ARPU would 
decrease meaning that telecom services became more affordable to the population. The Business 
Plan assumed a decrease from $22 to $11 in order to achieve the market penetration goal.  
Fixed Service 
The majority of fixed service sales were expected to be obtained from local businesses, 
governmental institutions, NGOs and UN institutions. In spite of the Government’s effort to 
positively discriminate the price of fixed services to households during the first years, the 
                                                          
54
 The UN’s Information Memorandum predicted a very reduced weight of the mobile service in future 
sales of a telecom operation in East Timor 
55
Author’s assumption was based on historical mobile market penetrations in Cambodia, Laos PDR and 
Indonesia (see Exhibit 6). 
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increasing demand of mobile would jeopardize the demand of the fixed broadband. Thus, as a 
starting point, it was considered that new telecom would have half of the fixed subscriptions 
existent prior to the turmoil56, representing a market penetration of 0,40%. It was assumed a 
market penetration goal of 2% to be accomplished during the concession period. The rationale 
behind was that East Timor would be able to develop a business and services sector that would 
demand fixed broadband services.  
The fixed broadband ARPU should be higher than the mobile ARPU since there were fixed 
monthly fees associated to this service and a higher pressure to recover from the large 
investment required to construct a wire network. High initial ARPU’s were justified by the 
presence of UN personnel and their need to perform international calls. 57 
Wire Line Internet Service 
Internet Service would be provided through wire line telephone connection (dial-up or 
broadband) during the concession period. The lack of a submarine cable connection with the 
exterior required a satellite connection to access international content and data, which was 
extremely costly for the new operator. Based on information available by ANACOM58 regarding 
the monthly ARPU of Internet Services in Portugal registered in 2001  (117€), it was assumed 
that the new venture would start with a $200 Internet ARPU. During the concession period 
ARPU was expected to decrease progressively in order to allow access to a higher portion of the 
Timorese population. In terms of market penetration, it was estimated based on the number of 
fixed telephone subscriptions. Projections were made assuming that 20% of fixed telephone 
subscriptions would also demand and consume Internet services. Along the years, it was 
forecasted that market penetration would increase due to the higher penetration of fixed 
telephone services and also because a higher percentage of these fixed subscriptions would 
demand Internet services. the increasing number of business and service companies that would 
be created in East Timor were considered, and also the increasing need of Internet services to 
provide a higher education to the Timorese youth. It is important to refer that Internet service 
was not included in the exclusive concession, meaning that other institutions and organizations 
could create their own conditions to get access to the worldwide web.  
Sales of mobile equipment 
The telecom would also provide the necessary equipment to get access to the different services 
provided. For the sake of simplicity, only mobile equipment sales were considered.  Mobile 
subscription gross adds were computed in each year in order to forecast demand of mobile 
devices (see Exhibit 7). The sales volume of mobile equipment was calculated bearing in mind 
the great influence of the parallel economy in East Timor. It is even more serious when it is 
related with technologic equipment. Thus, it was considered that only 20% of demand would 
buy original equipment sold by the operator at an average price of $100. 
                                                          
56
 Based on Information Memorandum released by UN, there were 6752 wire line subscriptions prior to 
the period of conflits. 
57 The value of $41 for initial ARPUS was provided by the original Business Plan elaborated by PT. The 
following evolution was based on author’s estimates.  
58 In “Relatório Sobre a Situação das Comunicações 2005”, ANACOM 
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Operational Costs Forecast 
The operational costs were calculated through an EBITDA margin over Operational Revenues. 
The margin ranged between 30% in first years of operations to 45% as the future company 
would gain operational efficiency59. This approach aims to consider the dilution of fixed costs as 
long as operational activity increases.  
Exhibit 8 shows the expected operational cost structure, where we can see the big influence of 
SG&A related costs, mainly due to the lack of supportive structural infrastructure in East Timor 
(power supply, roads). Despite of cheap local work force, there is a significant portion of costs 
related to Wages & Salaries, justified by the crucial presence of qualified people in the top 
management who demanded high remuneration to work and live in East Timor. Expenses 
related to marketing and publicity revealed the lack of competition.  
 
Investment Needs Forecast 
PT’s challenge in East Timor was ambitious and extremely capital intensive. In order to comply 
with short term BOT requirements and with the short term PT’s strategy, the initial investment 
amount would be between 22 to 25 Million USD. The majority of this amount would be used to 
build and develop the new telecommunications network. The national telecommunications 
network was completely destroyed despite the existence of some functional assets around the 
city of Dili. Those were valued at 10 Million USD by UN specialists and could be incorporated 
in the future wire line network. Thus, the Business Plan considered an initial investment of 12 
Million USD of which 5 Million would be invested in 2002 (year 0) and the remaining 7 Million 
USD would be used during 2013, the first year of operations. Moreover, PT’s specialists knew 
that the project’s economic profitability demanded a constant reinvestment in order to follow 
up the increasing number of subscriptions. These annual capital expenditures would be 
necessary to reinforce and expand the existent network capacity according to actual needs. An 
average of 15% of Operational Revenues should be reinvested in the network in order to 
achieve the 30% market penetration goal until the end of the concession period. Tangible and 
intangible assets had a life expectancy of 10 years60. 
Despite being a very capital intensive industry regarding fixed assets, telecom operators are 
able to finance by themselves their own working capital needs. Usually, telecom operators with 
large proportion of prepaid customers have balanced working capital results due to their ability 
to receive money in advance from customers (pre-paid system) and benefit of larger payment 
periods for their needs. In case of emerging markets, the credit risk is so high that only high 
income customer segments have access to credit from the operator (traditional post paid 
services). The Business Plan assumed that working capital needs would follow a linear 
behaviour according to revenues. Benchmarking with working capital needs of 4 comparable 
                                                          
59 EBITDA margins were assumed to be similar to Industry benchmarks in developing companies, 
including PT operations in Africa. 
60 This is the common depreciation rate of telecommunication assets.  
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telecom operators61 during 2000 and 2001, it was possible to achieve a Net Working 
Capital/Operational Revenues of -15%.  
 
Free Cash Flows to the Firm 
Going through all the required assumptions explained in previous points and assuming that the 
new telecom operator would have to pay 30%62 of its taxable income, the FCFF map is shown in 
Exhibit 9. 
 The payback period of this project is 6 years and 8 months and the Internal Rate of Return is 
29%. 
 
Project Valuation 
At this point it matters to determine the rate which would be used to discount the free cash 
flows originated by the project. The methodology to determine this rate followed some 
assumptions taken by the author in order to be possible to use a proper valuation method, 
available in Finance Theory. Those assumptions are to some extent uncertain but at the same 
time needed, especially when assessing a project investment in a country where market 
information is not available.  
PT’s investment in East Timor revealed to be a very hard valuation exercise due to lack of 
reliable market information. The author decided to perform a Discounted Cash Flow model, 
once the purpose of this case was deciding whether or not to apply for an exclusive concession 
licence in East Timor and how much would value the right of operating in those conditions. 
At a first stage, it is important to observe the financing scheme designed by PT for Timor 
Telecom. Based on the BOT requirements and the initial strategy adopted for TT, PT presented a 
business plan where tangible assets were financed 100% by equity. At this stage, PT and 
Vodatel would also contribute to finance the initial construction of the network, through 
shareholders’ loans. This shareholders availability and the extremely high cost of local long 
term debt led to this decision. Although a credit line of $10 Million had been negotiated with a 
local financial institution to finance punctual Working Capital needs, the author considered this 
interest bearing debt should not be incorporated in the capital structure of the new firm. As 
previously explained, it was not expected that TT would face working capital constraints if 
operational revenues followed a positive growth.  
Thus, the discussion about which model should be used to discount the free cash flows is not 
relevant since initial capital structure of the firm would be 100% equity. Moreover, it was 
neither expected to change.  The discount rate should be equal to the expected return of TT’s 
shareholders, known as Cost of Equity. 
                                                          
61
 Telkom Indonesia, Digicel Malaysia, Indosat and Phillipine Long Distance Calls 
62 This was the actual corporate tax in 2001 for the telecom industry. In “Unofficial Consolidation of 
UNTAET Regulation No. 2000/18 as Amended on a Revenue System for East Timor”, 2000. 
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Estimating the Cost of Equity 
The cost of equity was estimated based on the CAPM model, the most widely accepted model 
by practitioners to determine expected return of equity holders.  Additionally, Country Risk 
Premium was included once East Timor presented significant political and force majeure risks 
that should be incorporated in the discount rate. 
                                   
Where Rf stands for the risk free rate and represents the opportunity cost for investing in TT; β 
stands for the TT’s beta and represents the incremental risk of investing in TT related to a well-
diversified stock market; and MRP stands for the expected market risk premium of well 
diversified and liquid market. 
The risk free rate used should be denominated in the same currency as the company’s cash 
flows (US dollars) and it should be sufficiently liquid to represent the current market 
expectations. In order to satisfy these criteria, it was considered an average of weekly returns of 
the 10 year US Government Bond (USGG10YR) from 2001. The average just intends to strip out 
one-off effects that could bias the result by just looking at one observation. 
Beta was estimated through a comparison analysis with other telecom players that provided the 
same range of services as TT in the region of South East Asia. In order to obtain reliable market 
information for this case, the author assumed that the best TT’s proxies at the time would be 
two Indonesian operators, Telkom (TLKM IJ) and Indosat (ISAT IJ), the Philippine Long 
Distance Call (TEL PM) and Digicel Malaysia (DIGI MK) (see Exhibit 10). After deleveraging 
each company beta and performing an average, the author assumed that TT’s beta would be the 
unlevered industry beta (0,547) since no debt was involved in the financing scheme.  
Regarding the Market Risk Premium it was assumed 5%63. The discussion about which is the 
most accurate value for MRP goes beyond the scope of this case study. 
In order to address the question of Country Risk Premium (CRP), two different approaches 
were used.  
Country Bond Default Spreads 
This method intends to use ratings assigned to a country’s debt by rating agencies. The primary 
objective of these ratings is to inform investors about countries’ capacity to repay their debt and 
interests. However, ratings are computed using several factors that also drive equity risk, such 
as political stability, national budget and trade balances. Through these ratings, it is possible to 
determine default spreads over a riskless rate. The rationale behind is that the spread would 
represent the premium demanded by investors to invest in that country’s debt and bear market 
specific risks.  Referring back to this case, once again there was no reliable market information 
about the East Timorese market. East Timor did not issue public debt and consequently it was 
not under the scrutiny of rating agencies. Once again, it was necessary to assume that Indonesia 
would be the most accurate proxy for East Timor.  
                                                          
63
 In “Valuation – Measuring and Managing the Value of Companies” (2010) - Mckinsey. 
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Long term Indonesian debt (10 year Government Bonds) was rated as B3 in 2001, judged as a 
speculative and high credit risk asset64. Taking in consideration Aswarth Damodaran’s studies 
in 2002 (see Exhibit 11), the spread between the Indonesian 10 year Government bond and US 
Government with equivalent maturity amounted to 8,50%.  
 
Relative Standard Deviation 
The Relative Standard Deviation approach states that volatilities of emerging markets equities 
can provide a reasonable sense of the risk, when then compared with risk premium of a mature 
and well diversified market.  
Volatilities are commonly measured by the standard deviation in stock prices; higher standard 
deviation means more risk associated to that stock. Thus, it is possible to obtain a measure of 
relative risk by scaling the standard deviation of the emerging market against the mature 
market. 
 
                                    
                          
                   
 
 
The Equity Risk Premium in Indonesia could be achieved by multiplying its Relative Standard 
Deviation with the premium used for the US stocks (5%). 
 
                                                                                    
 
Assume that we are using a 5% Risk Premium for US and we had observed an annualized 
standard deviation in the S&P 500 (SPX) between 1999 and 2001 of 21,2%, whereas the Jakarta 
Stock Exchange (JCI) reported an annualized standard deviation of 29,3% during the same 
period. The Equity Risk Premium in Indonesia using these values would be 6,89%.  
 
The Country Risk Premium for Indonesia can be isolated by performing the difference between 
both market premiums, yielding a result of 1,89%.  
 
Comparing the results of both approaches, one realises that the Relative Standard Deviation 
yields a much lower result than the approach using Credit Default Spreads. Relative Standard 
Deviation approach can understate the equity risk premium of emerging markets, once there 
are significant problems when comparing standard deviations in markets with completely 
different market structures and liquidity. In 2002, a mature market such as S&P 500 had a 
different equities composition and it is much more liquid than the Jakarta Stock Exchange. 
However, the CDS approach has also inconvenient related with the lack of transparency 
                                                          
64 Source: Moody’s website ( http://www.moodys.com/ ) 
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pointed to the ratings methodology65. Critics point out that this methodology is too focused on a 
country default risk and ignores other risks that can influence equity markets and it did not 
fully reflect investors’ expectation about the future.  
When computing the cost of equity, results are dramatically different and consequently would 
have a huge impact on the project’s valuation (see Exhibit 12). Project´s Net Present Value 
(NPV) is $9,495 Million dollars discounting the FCFs at 16,27%, while project’s net present value 
would be $21,499 Million if FCFs were discounted at 9,66%. Both approaches presented a 
positive NPV of the project.   
 
Market Liberalization Process 
In the past, the available telecommunications technology was very costly and it demanded a 
huge financial effort in order to provide telecom services. For this reason, it was common to 
consider that this industry would benefit from “natural monopolies” where national 
governments played a very important role by providing themselves exclusive telecom services, 
through state owned telecom companies. 
Over the years, the exponential importance of telecommunications in the social and economic 
development of nations justified the interest of more players in exploring this industry. 
Consequently, the sector experienced a proportional increase in innovation and research that 
led to cheaper available technology. The world entered in the Globalization Era.  
There was no longer justification for protection policies or inefficiencies caused by public 
management. The Telecommunication industry’s evolution boosted the introduction of 
competitive policies in national telecom markets and suffered a wave of general privatizations. 
The Government’s role within the sector changed from operator to regulator. Chronologically, 
this reality was felt first in the most developed countries66 and then in developing countries67.  
 
Forecasting the Future Situation of the East Timorese Telecommunications Market 
The Timor Telecom’s case aims to extend the scope of the study to the liberalization process that 
the Timorese telecommunications sector is currently going through. The Government included 
liberalisation in the Strategic Development Plan 2011-2030 established as a top priorities. It is 
important to discuss what would be the possible benefits and challenges resulting from the 
liberalization, and how TT and new expected operators (Telin and Viettel) would be affected.  
                                                          
65 For instance, it is somehow incomprehensive how India did not see its rating changed in the period 
between 2004 and 2007, when it had achieved a double digit growth.   
66 The early 80’s brought the liberalization of the British and American telecom markets. In Portugal the 
law that allowed the entrance of new competitors was approved in 1989.  
67 The liberalization approval in India, nowadays the most competitive telecom market in the world, was 
only achieved in 1994. Indonesian telecom market was liberalized through the “Telecommunications Act 
of 1999”. 
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The main motivation behind the drive for liberalization was extending Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICTs) access to the whole population. The biggest concerns were 
the low rate of Internet usage and the high portion of population that remains isolated from 
progress and social development. By letting more operators entering the market, the 
government expects that sector prices drop. 
Typically, new competitors try to conquer market share by practising lower tariffs than the ones 
being practised. This initial strategic move intends to convince customers of the incumbent 
operator to consume their services. There is also the possibility of the incumbent operator to be 
the first one driving prices down in order to maintain its customers. Theoretically, the price 
elasticity of the telecom industry will guarantee increase on demand. Industry’s elasticity and 
the possibility of achieving the market full penetration potential will drive the growth of 
industry revenues. As “price wars” start in East Timor, ICTs will be more affordable for the 
population and consequently more accessible. Social welfare will be boosted by new 
opportunities that will accrue from a more informed and global integrated society.   
The liberalization will also positively influence the Timorese economy and benefits may be felt 
in the short term. The entering of two new international players will bring Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) and consequently increase employment levels. Once more, local construction 
industry will benefit from the actual telecommunication sector needs. FDI will mostly be 
redirected to the construction of a new telecom network, since the existent infrastructure is not 
able to support equipment from more than one operator. Recent legislation has been published 
in order to avoid overinvestment within the sector, but this is a common reality in liberalization 
processes.  
Competition should bring quality and efficiency improvements. The pressure of achieving 
highest possible market share will turn operator’s focus into consumer needs. “Price wars” 
should walk hand in hand with quality improvements on services, since the operator will need 
to offer the best quality price relation to its customers. However, this is not always so. Furious 
“Price wars” can also lead to decreases in quality. In a scenario where players are only focus on 
decreasing ARPUS to conquer market share, there is a breakeven point when operators start to 
become careless about the service quality. 
 A consumer focused strategy will demand higher operational costs, such as marketing, 
commercial and client support costs. Thus, operational effectiveness assumes a critical 
importance, especially in the survival of the incumbent operator. TT was used to experiencing 
healthy operational margins (see case Exhibit 12), but the new reality will bring fierce 
competition willing to conquer market share.  
The unkown of industry specialists related to future market shares of each operator. It is known 
that Telin aspires for a 43% market share within 4 years, and Viettel is well known for its 
aggressive price strategy among rural populations. There is also the big concern about the 
market being able to sustain three different operators.  Industry specialists denote that it is 
unlikely for the market to be equally divided (33% of market share for each operator) and there 
is a high probability of one operator being left with residual market share. If we look to the 
actual TT’s numbers it is reasonable to assume that 60% of market penetration is almost the full 
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market potential. Nowadays, children under the age of 14 still represent 46% of the total East 
Timorese population and this segment cannot be considered as potential customers. 
In the run for market share, it is recognized initial advantage to TT since it is already 
established and enjoys from its local expertize and know how. It is also common to see initial 
market inertia, with customers being reluctant to change their subscriptions. Another TT’s 
favourable factor is having its own network which suffered a recent expansion and is now 
capable of providing universal access to almost the entire Timorese population. Telin and 
Viettel will definitely experience huge cash flow demand in the first operating years. However, 
their investment capacity and their successful experience enjoying liberalization opportunities 
in other emerging markets promise to shake the Timorese Telecommunication Market in the 
upcoming years.   
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Exhibit 1 – GDP per capita in East Timor compared with its peers 
 
Source: World Bank Data 
 
Exhibit 2 - Poverty Headcount $1/day (as % of total population) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Timor-Leste Poverty Assessment: Poverty in a New Nation Analysis for Action, World 
Bank , 2003 
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Exhibit 3 – The General Global Survey about Operating Risks in Emerging Market (2006) 
 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit 2006 - “Operating Risk in Emerging Markets”  
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Exhibit 4 – The Final Consortium Structure Applied by PT in East Timor (Disclaimer) 
Following PT’s internationalization model, East Timor was considered a strategic market for the 
Group’s entry in the Asian market. Despite all the challenges imposed by such investment, PT’s 
final decision relied on the Group’s capacity to assume the responsibility of construct and 
operate the telecommunications infrastructure in East Timor. 
Therefore, in the end of 2001, PT delivered a tender’s application proposing the following 
equity structure of Timor Telecom. 
 
 Source: Timor Telecom  
 
TPT stands for “Telecomunicações Públicas de Timor” and it was the name given to the 
financial vehicle created with the purpose of giving Portugal Telecom a major position in TT’s 
equity.   
This company was majorly hold by Portugal Telecom (75%) and the remaining was distributed 
by Sociedade HAIRII (19%) and Fundação Oriente (6%).  
Júlio Alfaro and Óscar Lima were two successful Timorese businessman within the construction 
sector during the Indonesian occupation. It was also known that they were financial donors and 
active members of the two biggest political party at the time, CNRT and FRETILIN, 
respectively. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
54% 
17% 
21% 
4% 4% 
TPT  
Vodatel Systems Inc. 
Government 
Óscar Lima 
Júlio Alfaro 
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Mobile Market Penetration 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Lao PDR 0,13% 0,23% 0,24% 0,55% 1,00%
% growth 0,03% 0,10% 0,01% 0,31% 0,45%
Cambodia (1992) 0,51% 0,73% 1,05% 1,77% 2,96%
% growth 0,22% 0,22% 0,32% 0,72% 1,19%
Indonesia (1992) 0,51% 1,05% 1,72% 3,02% 5,34%
% growth 0,06% 0,54% 0,67% 1,30% 2,32%
Exhibit 5 – Mobile Subscriptions vs. Fixed Telephone Line 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: ITU and World Bank 
 
Exhibit 6 – Benchmarking mobile monthly ARPUS 
 
 
Exhibit 7 – Benchmarking mobile market penetration 
 
Source: ITU 
Note: Laos and Cambodia had a similar GDP per capita in 2001, comparing with East Timor. 
Despite having a larger GDP per capita, Indonesia was chosen due to natural similarities. 
 
Mobile Monthly ARPUS (USD), in 2001
Australia 54,02
Portugal 36,15
Singapore 41,89
Indonesia 18,75
Source: ITU
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2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Subs 18.534    25.921         31.015    36.325    46.532    61.992    78.190    110.178  143.452   188.680     235.913     274.248     303.001     332.442     
Net adds 18.534    7.387           5.094      5.310      10.207    15.460    16.198    31.988    33.274    45.228       47.233       38.336       28.752       29.442       
Gross adds 20.388    9.609           7.941      8.677      14.350    20.886    23.207    41.406    45.955    61.835       68.462       63.844       57.615       61.214       
Churn 1.853      2.223           2.847      3.367      4.143      5.426      7.009      9.418      12.681    16.607       21.230       25.508       28.862       31.772       
Exhibit 8 – Demand of mobile equipment 
Subs – number of subscribers in each year. 
Net Adds – number of subscribers registered in year i – number of subscribers registered in 
year (i-1) 
Churn – 10% of an average of number of subscribers in year i and year (i-1). It means that 10%68 
of subscribers stop consuming services.  
Gross Adds = Net Adds of year i + Churn of year i 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
 
Exhibit 9 – Expected  Operational Cost Structure  
 
 
Source: Author’s estimates based on information provided by industry professionals. 
 
Direct Costs are interconnection costs between operators, such as roaming, rent of satellite 
capacity, among others.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
68 This value was based on PT’s experience in Cape Verde, where it also operates as an exclusive services 
provider.  
Operational Costs Avg % of Total Interval
SG&A 37% 35% - 40%
Wages & Salaries 6% 5% - 10%
Direct Costs 17% 14% - 19%
COGS 12% 12% - 13%
Marketing & Publicity 2% 2% - 5%
Sales Taxes 14% 11% - 19%
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USD '000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Operational Revenues 8.582 10.395 11.965 13.745 11.181 14.260 17.764 24.855 31.300 40.802 46.359 51.331 54.093 57.075
%growth 21% 15% 15% -19% 28% 25% 40% 26% 30% 14% 11% 5% 6%
Operational Costs 6.008 7.276 8.137 9.209 7.715 9.554 11.724 15.410 18.780 23.257 25.497 28.232 29.751 31.391
%growth 21% 12% 13% -16% 24% 23% 31% 22% 24% 10% 11% 5% 6%
EBITDA 2.575          3.118        3.829              4.536        3.466        4.706        6.040        9.445        12.520     17.545      20.861         23.099         24.342         25.684         
Margin (%) 30% 30% 32% 33% 31% 33% 34% 38% 40% 43% 45% 45% 45% 45%
Depreciation 1.500      2.200     2.356         2.535     2.742     2.909     3.123     3.390     3.762    4.232     3.344       3.339       3.953       4.585       
EBIT 1.075      918        1.473         2.001     725        1.797     2.916     6.055     8.757    13.313   17.517     19.760     20.388     21.098     
NOPLAT 752         643        1.031         1.400     507        1.258     2.042     4.239     6.130    9.319     12.262     13.832     14.272     14.769     
Depreciation 1.500      2.200     2.356         2.535     2.742     2.909     3.123     3.390     3.762    4.232     3.344       3.339       3.953       4.585       
CAPEX 5.000   7.000      1.559     1.795         2.062     1.677     2.139     2.665     3.728     4.695    6.120     6.954       7.700       8.114       8.561       
ΔNWC (1.287)     (272)      (236)           (267)      385        (462)      (526)      (1.064)   (967)      (1.425)   (834)         (746)         (414)         (447)         
Total FCFF (5.000)  (3.460)     1.556     1.828         2.141     1.187     2.490     3.026     4.964     6.164    8.856     9.486       10.217     10.525     11.240     
Exhibit 10 - Projection of Free Cash Flows Map 
 
Source: Author’s estimates 
 
Exhibit 11 – Industry Betas 
 
 
 
Raw Betas were taken from Bloomberg. The data encompassed weekly observations of returns 
from each company and from the S&P500 during 3 years, prior to 2002.  
Debt to Equity ratio was also based on Bloomberg information regarding the fiscal year of 2001.  
Marginal tax rate presented were the current ones in 2002. Information was retrieved from 
“KPMG Corporate Tax Rate Survey – January 2002”.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Raw beta D/E Marginal Tax rate Raw Beta Unlevered
TLKM 1,01 1,57 30% 0,480
DIGI MK 1,59 1,28 28% 0,828
INDOSAT 0,95 1,05 30% 0,549
TEL PM PHP 0,87 2,41 32% 0,331
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Exhibit 12 – CDS scale basis points, in 2002  
 
These historical spreads represent an average over previous 5 years.  
Source: Aswarth Damodaran’s website (http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/) 
 
Exhibit 13 – Cost of Equity: results using different approaches to determine Country Risk 
Premium 
 
 
Source: Author’s estimates 
 
 
 
 
 
Rating Country Bond (H)
A1 100
A2 125
A3 135
Aa1 75
Aa2 85
Aa3 90
Aaa 0
B1 600
B2 750
B3 850
Ba1 325
Ba2 400
Ba3 525
Baa1 150
Baa2 175
Baa3 200
Caa 900
Ca 1100
CDS Approach
Relative Standard 
Deviation 
Approach
Cost of Equity 16,27% 9,66%
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